

The Initial Response of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) Towards the “Northern Territories” Issue: A Case Study *How Far Do the “Kuril Islands” Stretch?*

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The Minister of State said that the United States Administration now saw difficulty in the proposal that the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin should be ceded to Russia, since another clause of the Treaty provided that a State which did not sign the Treaty could not receive any benefits under it. The effect might be to leave the territories under Japanese sovereignty. They were occupied by Russia, and Russia considered that she already had a full title to them. It was, therefore, proposed that the Treaty should not go further than to provide that Japan renounced her sovereignty over these territories.

The Cabinet –

(4) Agreed that the draft Treaty should provide that Japan renounced her sovereignty over the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin.

Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W.1, on Thursday, 7th June, 1951, at 5 p.m.

The National Archives (United Kingdom), Records of the Cabinet Office, Cab 128/19

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2010年11月5日に行われた衆議院外務委員会で、日本共産党の笠井亮議員は、前原誠司外務大臣に対し、自民党がこれまでとってきた、国後および択捉がクリル諸島に含まれないとする立場を、政権交代を機に見直すよう求めた。他方、1951年6月7日に行われた英国の閣僚会議は、アメリカ行政政府の勧告を支持し、日本との平和条約には、クリル諸島および南樺太の主権放棄の条項のみを含めることを決めた。日ロ間の領土問題が政治化した責任は、ひとえに「冷戦」の論理が負わねばならない。サンフランシスコ平和条約は、ロシアが署名を拒否したことで、クリル諸島に対するロ

シアの主権を失わせる一方、日本の権利をも大きく制限するものであった。その結果、問題を更に政治化し、条約では名指しされていなかった「クリル諸島」の地理的な規定を見直し、国際法の基盤の脆弱化を促すような状況が生まれた。「冷戦」体制が瓦解して20年の歳月を経た今、価値観を根本から見直す時期が来たのではないだろうか。

日本には、国後および択捉の地位に対するコンセンサスが欠けており、これが北方領土返還要求の法的な価値を著しく弱める結果になっている。本稿では、日本社会党が国後および択捉を「クリル諸島」の一部とする当初の見解に注目しつつ、日本社会党のこのような立場が、日米安保条約論を含む「冷戦」の問題、また政党間抗争の問題とどう関わるのか、その関連を簡単に触れたいものである。¹本稿は、台湾太平洋研究学会『*Mapping and Unmapping the Pacific: Island Perceptions of an «Oceanic Continent»*』において2011年2月22日に著者による口頭発表の一部分を書き起こしたものである。²指数の関係上、参考文献を省いたが必要であれば提出することができる。

Debating the issue of the status of Kunashiri and Etorofu, the largest two islands of the “Northern Territories” disputed between Japan and Russia, in Japan’s National Diet on November 5, 2010, Kasai Akira, a deputy representing the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) which regards the two islands as a part of the “Kurile Islands” chain, appealed to the currently ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leadership to make use of the political power transition and initiate an urgent revision of the “Kurile Islands” scope problem. In the historical perspective, the Kasai vs. Seiji Maehara, Japan’s Foreign Minister as of early 2011, contention may be also viewed as connected to the very core of the current Russo–Japanese territorial dispute, in particular when considered against the background of the inter–party rivalry in Japan and the related subject of political power transition. The article attempts to offer a brief chronological review of the evolution of the JSP’s treatment of the “Northern Territories” issue, introducing a theme which has so far been unfairly neglected in critical literature and placing a particular emphasis on identifying links to the issue of maintaining the military alliance between Japan and the U.S.

In Japan, the designation of the disputed islands as not belonging to the “Kurile Islands” chain,

1 更にお知りになりたい方は Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press) <http://www.mpepil.com/>で著者による ‘Kuril Islands’ 項目を参照されたい(間もなく公開される)。北方領土問題の著者による分析を音声で聞くことができる：<http://www.forcedmigration.org/video/chishima/>

2 http://www.erenlai.com/pacific_en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=57: mapping-and-unmapping-the-pacificisland-perceptions-of-an-oceanic-continentq&catid=36: 2011-international-conference (Accessed on February 28, 2011)

a highly controversial interpretation, dates back to early 1960's, while until then it was common for the Japanese at large to regard the whole range of islands stretching from Hokkaido to the Kamchatka Peninsula, in some instances excluding either Shikotan or the Habomais, or both, as the “Chishimas”: a term that might in effect be viewed as identical to that of the “Kurile Islands”, which nevertheless served to give rise to as yet another contention rooted in the fact that the “Kurile Islands” term applied in the SFPT text appeared in the Japanese language version of the treaty as the “Chishima Islands”.

It is important to realize that, from the legal standpoint, the issue of the status of Etorofu and Kunashiri as observed in particular through the realm of inter-party rivalry between the LDP, Japan's ruling party for most of the post-World War II period, and the JSP amply testifies to the lack of consensus regarding the definition per se of the renounced “Kurile Islands” stretch, which in effect serves to substantially weaken the claimant's appeal, while numerous unanimously adopted National Diet resolutions demanding the “return” to Japan of the “Northern Territories” in fact serve to hide a highly sensitive and contradictory issue of the existence of a basic disagreement regarding the definition of the renounced territory.

The very first JSP document to have reviewed the “Northern Territories” problem was issued on 18 September, 1950, when post-war peace treaties were hotly debated. The document was entitled “Our Demands in Regard to the Peace Treaty” [講和条約の内容に対する和が党の要望]. The document made it clear that at that point the JSP, while considering the Habomais and Shikotan to be separate from the “Chishima Islands”, viewed both island groups as “minor islands” indicated in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration and recognized the right of the Allied Powers to dispose of them as found appropriate.

However, in the latter regard the document made the demand that the Allied Powers' final decision should be based on a high regard for the principles of the Atlantic Charter of 1941. The document specifically mentioned the following two principles of the Atlantic Charter: (1) that the Allies would seek no territorial aggrandizement and (2) that they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.

Deserving further critical attention is the document issued on October 2, 1951 and entitled “Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee on Merits and Demerits of the Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty”. The report was delivered by the Committee Chairman, Wada Hiroo. Issued after the signing of the SFPT but before its ratification by the Japanese Diet, this document

reviewed various representative positions that had been expressed by the JSP's Foreign Affairs Committee members.

Wada Hiroo noted that on the whole, "unfortunately", opinions on the subject differed. Thus, speaking of the estimates regarding a relationship between the international situation and the Peace Treaty, Wada indicated that views of Katsumata Seiichi and Sone Eki, two of the Committee's members, were basically opposed to one another. Specifically, Sone while admitting that the Third World War was not inevitable, at the same time believed that the offensive against peace by the "international communist camp" did spread a high risk. Sone also claimed that even though the "international communist camp" showed distaste for provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT), this did not imply that developments in Korea had to lead to an all-out war involving Japan's participation.

On his part, Katsumata, believing as well that the Third World War was not inevitable, nevertheless warned that the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. was gaining momentum and in particular that the situation in Asia, especially as it revolved around the "Korean issue", was growing strained. Moreover, in contrast to Sone's estimate, Katsumata claimed that in case the United States and Japan concluded a separate peace treaty along with a mutual defense treaty, with both of them seeing China and the Soviet Union as "potential enemy states", the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. would intensify and various conflicts in Asia centering on developments in Korea would become more difficult to resolve. Adding that since it was "obvious" that according to both treaties Japan was obligated to interfere with "these and other [similar] conflicts", Katsumata asserted that in the event of the Third World War Japan's involvement was "unavoidable".

Nevertheless, according to Wada's report, all the Committee members on the whole showed dissatisfaction with provisions which pertained to territorial issues. Firstly, as the report indicated, Committee members claimed reversion of Japan's territorial rights to the Southern Sakhalin and the "Chishima Archipelago", stressing specifically that the Yalta Agreement's provisions were not binding on Japan.

Secondly, it was declared that the Habomais and Shikotan were "undoubtedly" Japan's territories and that in case the Soviet Union refused to "return" them to Japan, the matter would be brought forward to the International Court in anticipation of a fair settlement.

Thirdly, implying provisions of Article 3 of the SFPT, Committee members expressed a protest against placing under the United Nation Organization's trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administrative authority, the Nansei Shoto (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Dai to islands, the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Islands, the Volcano Islands, the Parece Vela and Marcus Islands, and claimed reversion of Japan's sovereign rights to these territories.

In this regard Wada also mentioned that in addition to arguments of historical, ethnic, and geographical nature, in defense of their territorial claims "all the Committee members—had unanimously demanded application of 'non-annexation' and 'non-aggrandizement' principles stipulated in the Atlantic Charter of 1942".

The very first JSP's official document which put forward a linkage between the 'Northern Territories' issue and the U.S. military presence in Japan was the "General Principles of the Political Course" adopted at the JSP Unification Congress which took place on 13 October, 1955. One of the JSP's major political documents, it stipulated a demand for the "return" of "the Habomais, Shikotan, Chishimas, Southern Sakhalin" as linked with the U.S. presence on Okinawa and the Ogasawara's (Bonin).

At the same time, it appealed for the conclusion of a "simple peace treaty" between Japan and the U.S.S.R., declaring the end of the war and the need for a restoration of diplomatic relations. Moreover, as an emergency measure in case the bilateral negotiations regarding a peace treaty were delayed, it suggested to first of all to conclude a bilateral "provisional agreement" stipulating the end of the war and proposing to continue negotiations regarding conclusion of the peace treaty and a resolution of "various other pending problems".

The position expressed in the "General Principles of the Political Course" was further elucidated in the document issued on 2 February, 1956, and entitled "The Political Course in Regard to Restoration of the Japanese-Soviet Diplomatic Relations". This document was issued in the midst of bilateral negotiating process which led to the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration in October 1956.

Containing two parts, devoted to "basic political course" and a "concrete political course", respectively, the document stipulated in the first part that the JSP planned to conduct foreign policy on the basis of "autonomous independence" in relation to either the "free camp" or the "com-

unist camp” by means of establishing friendship and goodwill relations with all the countries of the world and representing a fully independent Japan. As it applied to the Soviet–Japanese relations in particular, the document referred to the above mentioned part of the “General principles of the Political Course” as the party’s “basic policy line”.

The document specified a “concrete political course” in regard to territorial issues in two sections of its second part, dealing with a proposed content of the peace treaty and a “provisional agreement”, respectively.

Addressing separately the issue of the status of the Habomais and Shikotan, the document asserted that these islands originally represented a “part of Hokkaido” and accounted for the Soviet Union’s de facto occupation by referring to the Soviet Union’s “accidental military presence” on these islands in the end of the war. Concluding that consequently provisions of Article 2 of the SFPT according to which Japan “had renounced its rights to the Southern Sakhalin and the Chishima Islands” had nothing to do with the Habomais and Shikotan, the document advised that it was “natural” to claim the “reversion of this area to Japan” in the course of the “forthcoming negotiations”.

Turning attention to the Southern Sakhalin and the “Chishima Islands”, the document stipulated that the JSP was appealing to resolve the issue of their “reversion” in connection with the issue of the status of Okinawa and the Ogasawaras and by means of conducting either “separate” or “joint” negotiations. The latter provisions imply conducting either “separate” negotiations with the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., respectively, or “joint” negotiations between Japan, the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. at once.

Pointing out that the territorial claims were in violation of the SFPT’s Article 2, the document emphasized “fairness” of the JSP’s stance by referring, firstly, to the fact that Japan “had nothing to do with the Yalta Agreement” and, secondly, to essential features of the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration (implying the ‘territorial non-aggrandizement’ principle) as well as “historical background” and “ethnic feelings” applying to the area in question.

In addition, it was stipulated that if in relation to the peace treaty there were any territorial areas which could not be defined as due to the “return” [返還の実現が不可能な地域], a reference to their future status as a pending issue had to be recorded in the text of a peace treaty.

The section dealing with a “provisional agreement” might be regarded as of a particular importance because it looked forward to the “return” of the Habomais and Shikotan as a prerequisite for the conclusion of an agreement leading to signing of the peace treaty expected to find the territorial issue resolution. In fact, this particular vision had remarkably anticipated a concept formulated in the bilateral Joint Declaration of October 1956 which offered “transfer” of the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan as a route towards the conclusion of a further major agreement.

The JSP viewed the signing of a “provisional agreement” exclusively as a practical measure prompted by two factors: firstly, a high probability of a rupture of the negotiating process conducted on the basis of the past evidence and, secondly, the search for a compromise in order not to “lose a perspective” of the restoration of bilateral diplomatic relations, “no matter how fair our party’s demands in regard to these problems [territorial issues] are”.

In addition, appealing to a common sense, the document warned that since the Soviet Union based its territorial claims on the Yalta Agreement’s provisions and sustained its territorial rights to the Southern Sakhalin and the “Chishima Islands” by referring to provisions of the SFPT, neither the U.S. nor Great Britain could be expected to “flatly refute” the Soviet Union’s official stance. Extending the linkage still further, the document indicated that as long as the de facto “dominance” over the Ogasawaras and Okinawa by the U.S. continued, it was difficult to persuade the Soviet Union to end its territorial control.

Hypothesizing about the “worst scenario”, the JSP document suggested to conclude in that case, “for the lack of the alternative”, a “provisional agreement” that stipulated the end of hostilities, the restoration of diplomatic relations, the repatriation of war criminals and detainees, the “return” of the Habomais and Shikotan and the unconditional support for Japan’s entry into the United Nations Organization, leaving various other pending problems, including “remaining territorial issues”, as due to be resolved after the conclusion of the “provisional agreement”.

Speculating about the linkage between the Japanese–Soviet territorial disputes and the U.S. military presence in Japan, “The Political Course in Regard to Restoration of the Japanese–Soviet Diplomatic Relations” of February 1956 fell short, however, of forcing both issues to collide head-on with one another. The latter was attempted in August of the same year in a document entitled “On the Current Stage of the Japanese–Soviet Negotiations” [日ソ交渉の現段階について].

Issued on 29 August, 1956, this document offered the JSP’s analysis of the crisis which began to

evolve soon after the bilateral normalization talks started for the third time. In the middle of August the then Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu Mamoru, “was ordered to break off talks” held in Moscow. Contributing his share to the breakdown of negotiations, on 19 August, 1956 the then U.S. Secretary of the State, John Foster Dulles, told Shigemitsu during their brief encounter in London that “if Japan formally recognized Soviet title to the South Kuriles in a peace treaty, the United States would annex Okinawa”.

As if responding to the Dulles ‘warning, the JSP’s document entitled “On the Current Stage of the Japanese–Soviet Negotiations”, as of late August 1956, declared that the abrogation of both the SFPT and the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty remained the “nationwide demand of the Japanese people” and, implying the JSP’s will to abrogate both, that when the JSP’s consistent demands for a foreign policy line of “autonomous independence” were realized it would become possible to plan a basic resolution of the Japanese–Soviet Japanese territorial disputes.

At the same time, the document leveled severe criticism at the LDP government’s policy of “being totally committed to America” and uselessly denouncing “all the communist countries”. Referring to Japan as the country where the U.S. military bases were welcome anywhere, the document, while being critical of the Soviet Union’s clinging to an “old product” of disposing of territories on the basis of “bargains” struck between the great powers, condemned primarily the LDP government’s foreign policy for having invited such a Soviet Union’s response. Consequently, the document considered the LDP’s policy line to be the cause of a serious concern, particularly in relation to the resolution of the Japanese–Soviet territorial issues.

The JSP’s early linkages between the Soviet–Japanese territorial issues and the U.S. military presence in Japan, while as a rule implying a possibility to resolve the former by means of a prior liquidation of the latter, included as well the reverse sequence. Thus, speaking at the plenary session of the National Diet’s Lower House on 27 November, 1956, and expressing the JSP’s willingness to approve of the ratification of the Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration, the JSP deputy, Matsumoto Shichiro, emphasized that one of the most essential merits of the Japanese–Soviet normalization rested with its being a “turning point” in the direction towards the establishment of Japan’s full independence and “autonomous foreign policy”.

In that regard, Matsumoto accused the LDP government, and specifically the then Prime Minister, Hatoyama Ichiro, of assuming a passive attitude towards the international situation. Providing an example, Matsumoto mentioned that Prime Minister Hatoyama in his replies to queries of

deputies frequently stated that both the signing of a peace treaty and the resolution of the territorial issues could be achieved when the international situation "changed for the better".

Results of an examining the Diet hearings which preceded the ratification of the 1956 Joint Declaration testify to the fact that Matsumoto's references to such statements by Hatoyama were well-grounded. Thus, one of the most characteristic statements as it is, on 22 November, 1956, Hatoyama, while answering deputies' queries at the meeting of the 'Special Committee on the Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration' [日ソ共同宣言特別委員会] asserted as follows :

"As you all know, the [resolution] of the status of Etorofu [and] Kunashiri is deferred until the period of the signing of a peace treaty. As for the Habomais [and] Shikotan, it has been also settled that the Soviet Union will acknowledge their belonging to Japan when the peace treaty is signed. Concerning the period of the signing of a peace treaty as well as the time when at last the belonging of Etorofu [and] Kunashiri to Japan might be settled, I tend to think that the Soviet Union's will may only change in accordance with changes in the international situation."

"By [referring to] the international situation I imply that when there occurs an easing of tension between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, then there will be an opportunity. Today, all the people think that if the international tension eases, and a highway to peace opens wide, then the Soviet Union might stop clinging to [retaining] Etorofu [and] Kunashiri."

It was this particular approach that Matsumoto Shichiro, the JSP deputy, chose to criticize as passive, indicating that Hatoyama "had never dropped a word" about a positive role that Japan had to play or a specific policy it had to adopt striving to improve the international situation.

Proceeding further to form a linkage, Matsumoto, stressing that normalization of the Japanese-Soviet relations was a "starting point" leading towards "reaching a full independence", suggested that the time was ripe for an abrogation of both the SFPT and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as well as for the withdrawal of the U.S. military bases from Japan.

In the wake of the signing of the Joint Declaration of 1956, the Soviet Union and the JSP proceeded to establish close contacts, beginning from an official visit to Moscow of the JSP delegation in October 1957. The Joint Statement signed on that occasion by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the JSP on 11 October, 1956, while abstaining from any references to bilateral territorial issues, confirmed that normalization of the Japanese-Soviet relations gave

birth to an opportunity to develop extensive bilateral cooperation in the spheres of economy, science and culture.

“Ivan Kovalenko, formerly the CPSU International Department’s chief executive responsible for the Soviet–Japanese relations, in his memoirs recalls that ever since the first official contact between the CPSU and the JSP occurred in October 1957, the two parties’ relationship grew stronger, gradually spreading over a large variety of areas despite differences in terms of political convictions”.

Results of the 28th general election to the National Diet’s Lower House (House of Representatives) held on 22 May, 1958, amply testify to the fact that policies the JSP proposed, including the party’s approach to territorial issues, were readily accepted by the public at large. Specifically, the JSP gained as much as 32.9 percent of votes, receiving support from 13,093,993 voters. Drawing a comparison with the 27th general Election held on 27 February, 1955, when Socialists were divided into the Left Socialist Party and the Right Socialist Party, in May 1958 we observe a substantially strengthened public support, with 1,920,000 more votes gained.

On their part, the LDP, gaining the largest number of votes, won support from 22,976,846 voters or 57.8 percent of votes in toto, during the 28th general election. Thus, as a result of the May 1958 general election the LDP and the JSP appeared on the Japanese political scene as two major rivals, in effect splitting the society into two opposed halves.

A major change in the JSP’s approach to the Japanese–Soviet territorial disputes occurred in October 1961 when the JSP issued a document entitled “The JSP’s Attitude to the Northern Territories Issue: A Political Course in Regard to the Resolution of the Territorial Issue” [日本社会党の北方領土問題に対する態度—領土問題解決の方針], featuring a firm linkage between the territorial dispute and the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty.

One of the major events which had directly instigated the change of policy was a series of personal meetings between Suzuki Mosaburo, the JSP Chairman from 1955 until 1960, and Nikita Khrushchev, the then Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers and the first Secretary of the CPSU, and a meeting between Suzuki and Anastas Mikoyan, the then member of the CPSU CC Presidium (Political Bureau), which took place on 25th, 27th and 29th of August and 25th of August, 1960, respectively, during the JSP delegation’s visit to Moscow on an invitation extended by Institute of Oriental Studies of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.

In late 1950's–early 1960's, the Soviet–Japanese relations primarily revolved around the issue of the revision of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. According to Kovalenko, after a “completely fruitless” Korean war ended, top leadership of both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union began working on a “new approach” regarding Japan, which aimed at “detaching” Japan from the U.S. sphere of influence and bringing it closer to Asian “socialist countries”.

This strategy was chosen, as Kovalenko related, because it was thought that Japan was the “easiest country to work with” in terms of achieving the goals of (1) forming a generally favorable for the “socialist camp” situation in the Far East and South–East Asia and (2) establishing in the Far East of a large area politically, economically and militarily integrated into a single block of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or EC (European Community) types.

Further, it was also thought that compelling the U.S. to withdraw its military forces from Japan and a subsequent formation of an “independent, neutral” Japan would deliver a decisive blow to the political and military posture of the United States in this area. According to Kovalenko, on its part the United States, sensing that retreating from Japan signified a major strategic loss, pursued a policy line of “binding Japan” to provisions of numerous treaties and agreements with the purpose of “completely subordinating” Japan in the spheres of politics, military and foreign affairs, economy, science and technology.

Kovalenko mentioned the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty “which had resolved that the U.S. military bases could be deployed anywhere in Japan” as the most significant bilateral treaty of this kind, indicating that in order to turn Japan into a platform serving to promote the fulfillment of the U.S. policy goals in Asia, the United States intended to pull Japan ever deeper into the military alliance and strongly demanded an early revival of Japan's own military might.

In this regard, while pointing out that Japanese “ruling circles” supported and sided with the U.S. strategy, Kovalenko admits that in view of such circumstances the Political Bureau of CPSU Central Committee ordered the CPSU Central Committee International Department and other related organs to draw up a long–term plan for promoting the formation of a “united front” embracing “Japanese democratic and progressive forces” and aiming at the creation of a “neutral Japan”.

Further, in this regard Kovalenko also admitted that a “group which kept a very close watch on Japanese democratic forces” was functioning within the CPSU Central Committee's Interna-

tional Department for almost three years, providing “quite a substantial help” to them. Kovalenko commented that the Japanese “democratic forces” which made up a bulwark of the “united front struggling for Japan’s neutrality” comprised, first of all, the JCP, the JSP, as well as a number of youth and women’s organizations, and “patriotic intellectuals”.

According to Kovalenko, the CPSU Central Committee thought that the idea of making Japan a “neutral country like Switzerland” had to attract a large number of Japanese “patriots”. Indicating that the issue of the revision of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty was in the focus of attention, Kovalenko noted that in the second half of 1958 the CPSU Central Committee arrived at the conclusion that there was a need for all the “democratic parties” (implying primarily the JCP and the JSP) to “act in unity” while struggling against the revision of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and for “neutral” Japan. According to Kovalenko, this conclusion was prompted by observing energetic activities of Japanese “conservative forces”.

Testifying to a keen interest the CPSU Central Committee took in this project, Kovalenko admitted that special “contact groups” of the Central Committee’s International Department and of “other concerned agencies” were responsible for maintaining liaison with Japanese “democratic forces” and reporting about trends in the struggle against the revision of the U.S.–Japan Security treaty to Mikhail Suslov, the then CPSU Central Committee Political Bureau (Presidium) member, who was a top executive in charge of the project.

The territorial issue played a major role in terms of the “neutralization strategy” adopted by the CPSU in relation to Japan, with the most salient feature of its application being the linkage this issue readily provided to the issue of the U.S. military presence in Japan. The linkage was all the more suitable since it not only related to a plausible inclusion of the disputed area into the application sphere of the revised U.S.–Japan Security Treaty but also directly challenged the U.S. overwhelming military presence on the Okinawa island whose dubious status was based on provisions of Article 3 of the SFPT.

Typically, the Soviet government’s ‘Memorandum’ to Japan of 27 January, 1960, while explicitly criticizing the signing of the revised U.S.–Japan Security Treaty on 19 January of that year, stipulated as well that “the Soviet Union cannot allow itself to contribute to an extension of the territory used by foreign armed forces by handing” the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan. Referring to Okinawa and the Ogasawaras in particular, the ‘Memorandum’ warned that the treaty in effect “alienated” them from Japan in the process of perpetuating the “actual occupation of Japan”

and placing "her territory at the disposal of a foreign power".

As regards Okinawa and the Ogasawaras, it is worth noting that demands for their "return" to Japan were made not only by the JSP but as well even within the then ruling LDP. Thus, on April 10, 1958, nine Lower House deputies, representing the LDP deputies' group called "A Society for the Study of Territorial issues" which consisted of 34 people, visited the then Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke's residence, delivering a message which suggested to secure the "return" to Japan of the Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashiri, Etorofu as well the "immediate reversion" of the Ogasawaras and Okinawa. The LDP deputies' delegation included Suma Yakochiro, Inaba Osamu and Kojima Tetsuzo.

However, the above mentioned Soviet government's 'Memorandum' of January 1960 linked the territorial issue to the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty not only negatively but constructively as well, promising to turn the Habomais and Shikotan over to Japan "on condition of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Japan and the conclusion of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan".

Similarly, Nikita Khrushchev on 18 June, 1957, in an interview with Hirooka Tomoo, Editor-in-Chief of the 'Asahi Shinbun', Japanese daily newspaper, spoke as follows :

"As soon as the peace treaty is signed, the islands of Habomai and Shikotan will be immediately turned over to Japan. I do not know what is keeping Japan from concluding a peace treaty. We are at a loss to understand it...There are no forces in your country who would be opposed to the conclusion of a peace treaty. Apparently it is a matter of external forces. If we returned the islands of Habomai and Shikotan before the signature of a peace treaty, it would seem that we were helping the external forces retarding the conclusion of the treaty."

"But if the Americans were to return to you the island of Okinawa...I would approach our government with a proposal to turn the islands of Habomai and Shikotan over to Japan even before signing the peace treaty. It is my opinion that you do not press the U.S.A. sufficiently to make it return the island of Okinawa. As agreed we shall return these islands to you only if a peace treaty is concluded."

As if in response to Khrushchev's linkages, the then Japanese Prime Minister and concurrently the head of the LDP, Kishi Nobusuke, stated on 21 June, 1957, at the National Press Club in

Washington, D.C. that “Japan is determined to press her legitimate territorial demands” and proceeded to delink the territorial issue from that of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty by indicating as follows :

“Japan will never go communist, or neutralist. We will always be on the side of the free world. We recognize that our own security as a free nation depends upon the security of the free world. At the same time, we believe that the security of the free world depends upon Japan’s remaining free and firm in the Far East. And we believe that in order to keep our position strong and to play an effective role, close cooperation with the United States is absolutely essential.”

“The central role in the cooperative structure between Japan and the United States is the security treaty. This structure was established to meet the unstable situation in the Far East. It goes without saying that it will continue to remain the crux of Japanese–American security....”

On their part, meeting in August 1960 with the Soviet Union’s top political figure, Nikita Khrushchev, in Moscow, the JSP delegation headed by Suzuki Mosaburo represented about one-third of Japanese voters whose political convictions, in particular as they applied to foreign affairs, substantially differed from those shared by the LDP supporters. Results of the 29th general election as of 20 November, 1960, demonstrated a balance of political forces which was basically similar to that of the previous election, with the LDP this time gaining 57.56 percent of votes and the JSP gaining 27.56 percent. The fact that, as compared to the 28th general election, the JSP lost 5.34 percent of votes might be accounted for by a reference to appearance on the election scene of the ‘Minshato’, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which gained 8.77 percent of votes.

The very first top level encounter between the JSP and personally Nikita Khrushchev took place in October 1957. While the official Joint Statement issued on October 11, mentioned above, did not contain any references to bilateral territorial issues, the JSP records inform that during the meeting Khrushchev, the then First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, declared while addressing the JSP delegation headed by Katayama Tetsu, formerly the Japanese Prime Minister in 1947–48 and the JSP Chairman from 1946 until 1950, that he was willing to offer territorial concessions as soon as Okinawa was “returned” to Japan. However, according to Wada Haruki, in response to Katayama’s demand for the “return” of all the “Chishima Islands” and the Southern Sakhalin, Khrushchev refused to consider a “transfer” to Japan of anything beyond the Habomais and Shikotan.

Consequently, in the wake of the JSP delegation's return to Japan, during a meeting of the JSP Central Executive Committee held on 20 February, 1958, it was reportedly resolved to drop the demand for the "reversion" of the Southern Sakhalin in reference to pertaining "difficulties".

The '*Okinawa-Northern Territories*' linkage figured prominently in the course of the August 1960 top level JSP-CPSU meetings as well. I would like to draw attention to the very first meeting which took place on August 25, involving in particular Mikoyan and Suzuki. During this meeting, the JSP delegation members, Suzuki, Okada and Hozumi, consistently linked bilateral territorial disputes to the issue of "abolishing" the Security Treaty, apparently intending to secure Mikoyan's support for the concept they put forward.

Thus, Suzuki made it clear that there were two factors which served to obstruct the signing of a peace treaty and as such had to be removed: revision of the Security Treaty and the Japanese-Soviet territorial dispute. As it applied to the former, Suzuki expressed the JSP's strong desire to abolish it for the sake of winning "peace for Japan". While it was Suzuki's understanding that the Soviet Union could ill afford to "return" the "Chishimas" as long as there was a Security Treaty, at the same time he appealed to Mikoyan to necessarily consider an option of the abolished Security Treaty and hence of having no reasons left to worry in particular about the fact that the "Chishimas" could be used for military purposes by "the enemy". Suzuki also mentioned that the Japanese people were very much concerned about the Soviet Union's position in that regard.

At the same time, Suzuki, while readily agreeing with Mikoyan that "a certain foreign country" intended to advantageously employ the territorial issue in order to, in particular, "alienate" Japan from the Soviet Union, nevertheless consistently emphasized the importance of resolving the territorial issue by means of signing a peace treaty containing an adequate settlement.

On his part, Okada similarly linked resolution of the territorial issue to the abrogation of the Security Treaty, adding that it was a mistake to consider the "Chishima issue" to be only a "propaganda tool" of the United States. He brought forward several reasons why the Japanese people were so anxious about this problem. Firstly, Okada referred to the islands' economic value in terms of fishing. Secondly, he referred to the fact that Japan had been the first to discover and subsequently integrate the "Southern Chishimas", implying Kunashiri and Etorofu. Thirdly, Okada mentioned that the Japanese people regarded the "Northern Chishimas" to be their "national territory" in reference to the bilateral agreement of 1875.

Finally, Okada pointed out that while he felt no regret for Japan's having lost the territories it had gained "by violence", he did very much regret Japan's having lost Okinawa, the "Chishima Islands" and the Ogasawaras, in effect combining these territories into a special single category.

Addressing Mikoyan, Hozumi primarily emphasized the pertinent legal aspects. Combining on his part the Ogasawaras, the "Chishima Islands" and Okinawa into a single category of Japan's "immemorial territories", Hozumi indicated a wide discrepancy between the SFPT provisions which forced Japan to renounce its rights to them and provisions of the Potsdam Declaration which in particular stipulated the "territorial non-aggrandizement principle". Implying relevant provisions of the Cairo Declaration, he also mentioned that he did not think that Japan had gained these islands "by violence".

Consequently, Hozumi suggested to first of all, before Japan could proceed to negotiate the territorial issue with the Soviet Union, revise territorial clauses of the SFPT. Referring to the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, Hozumi pointed out that it had been "imposed" on Japan as "inseparably related" to the SFPT, lamenting that while Japan's territory was originally supposed to be used for peaceful purposes and for the sake of national prosperity, it turned out so that the Japanese territory came to be employed in favor of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, the United States and for "America's war against the Soviet Union".

Accordingly, as the second political measure, Hozumi suggested to abrogate the Security Treaty and, typically, inquired whether or not the Soviet Union could consider "returning" the "Chishima Islands" to Japan provided the above mentioned measures were carried out.

However, replying to insistent queries of Suzuki, Okada and Hozumi, Anastas Mikoyan abstained from linking the abrogation of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty to the "reversion" of the "Chishima Islands", implicitly indicating willingness to transfer to Japan only the Habomais and Shikotan. At the same time, Mikoyan did not reject the JSP's offer, choosing instead to diminish the overall economic value of the "Chishima islands" area and to praise the option of Japan's turning into a neutral state.

As regards the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, Mikoyan expressed his sincere appreciation of the "struggle" the Japanese people put up against its revision. He stated that the Soviet Union was against the Security Treaty because the latter allegedly served to "drive a wedge" between the Soviet Union and Japan. He claimed that it was in the interests of the United States to foster de-

terioration of the Soviet–Japanese relations because the United States was willing “to employ Japan as a military base for attacking the Soviet Union”. Apparently as a means to reverse effects of the U.S. strategy, Mikoyan expressed a desire to significantly widen the sphere of bilateral contacts on a long–term basis, specifically naming economy, culture, and technology.

Implying abrogation of the Security Treaty, Mikoyan advised Japan to develop friendly relations with the Soviet Union and China by pursuing “independent, peaceful and friendly” policies. He warned that remaining a military ally of the United States could not guarantee security but, on the contrary, led to the danger of an exposure to the atomic war and the “automatic” involvement in the U.S. global strategy. In this particular regard Mikoyan estimated the JSP’s struggle for the abrogation of the U.S.–Japan Security treaty as “significant”, adding that the Soviet Union was looking forward to the achievement of that goal since it was a “matter of life or death” for Japan.

Speaking of the dangers pertaining to Japan’s position as the U.S. ally, Mikoyan, while explicitly refusing to call it a “threat”, emphasized that the Soviet Union was equipped with “victorious weapons” and that in case a war started, Japan as the enemy based in the proximity to the Soviet Union could suffer irreparable damage. Offering what he considered being an effective remedy, Mikoyan asserted that “the most beneficial” policy line Japan could choose was the neutrality option. Citing as examples Finland and Austria, Mikoyan highly praised neutrality for promoting material prosperity and security. Moreover, Mikoyan promised that the Soviet Union’s government would support Japan’s bid for the recognition of Japan’s neutrality status.

Appraising the “Chishima issue”, Mikoyan, firstly, indicated that the islands were not suitable for maintaining an adequate standard of living and on the whole had no economic value. Acknowledging that they were important strategically, Mikoyan nevertheless concluded that “if the Chishima Islands are not transferred [to Japan], Japan will suffer no losses”.

Secondly, Mikoyan claimed that the territorial issue only served as an instrument for “agitating the anti–Soviet mood” in Japan, indicating also that in Japan there were very few people who really “needed the Chishima Islands”. According to Mikoyan, there was no basis for claims that a peace treaty could not be concluded because the Soviet Union refused to “return the Chishimas”, asserting that as a result Japan was suffering a serious damage.

Mikoyan criticized the JSP for viewing the problems of the “Chishimas” and Okinawa as similar

issues. He claimed that there were no reasons whatsoever to entertain any doubts about the fact that Okinawa was Japan's "immemorial territory", indicating that "the Americans had never lived there". Mikoyan praised the struggle for Okinawa's "return" as "rightful" and characterized the U. S. presence there as an "illegal occupation".

Touching on the topic of the "Chishima Islands", Mikoyan mentioned that the relevant Soviet sources testified to an early discovery by the Russians and stated that the Soviet position regarding that issue had been already explained by Khrushchev to the JSP delegation in October 1957. He commented that it was bewildering to observe inability of the Japanese people to comprehend the essence of the territorial issue and blamed Japanese political parties for deliberately spreading false ideas.

It is worthwhile noting that Mikoyan attached importance to the fishery issue and promised that when the peace treaty was concluded the Soviet Union would offer a favorable resolution. A similar linkage had been established by the Soviet side in March 1958 when the *Pravda* newspaper, the CPSU Central Committee's printing organ, published a statement regarding the Soviet-Japanese territorial issue.

The *Pravda* article contained one of the earliest Soviet statements which flatly denied, from a legal standpoint, existence of the bilateral territorial issue, in particular indicating as follows :

"It is well known that the territorial question was settled...by such international agreements as the Crimean and Potsdam agreements and by Japan's Act of Surrender. Even in the San Francisco treaty of September 8, 1951, Japan confirmed its repudiation of all rights, titles and claims to the Kurile Islands and to that part of Sakhalin and adjacent islands over which Japan obtained sovereignty under the Portsmouth treaty of September 5, 1905."

"The Japanese Diet cannot fail to recall that when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was debated in the Diet before ratification, Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister at that time, and Kumao Nishimura, then director of the treaty bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confirmed that Japan had relinquished claims to the Kurile Islands including the islands of Kunashir [Kunashiri] and Iturup [Etorofu], which are claimed by Japanese ruling circles."

"It follows that there is no unresolved territorial question and that the Japanese government's territorial demands are unfolded."

However, referring to the request of June 1957 by the Japanese government to "permit Japanese fishermen to fish in the coastal waters of the Kurile Islands" and urging Japan to conclude a peace treaty, *Pravda* proceeded to link both issues, making the following concession :

"If a peace treaty had been concluded, many thousands of Japanese fishermen would have had the opportunity to engage in fishing...in the area of Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island, which would have been turned over to Japan. Moreover, after the conclusion of a peace treaty, the question of Japanese fishing in Soviet territorial waters in some areas of the Kurile Islands could be favorably examined."

Slightly more than a year after Suzuki's meetings with Khrushchev and Mikoyan, on 8 October, 1961, the JSP Central Executive Committee issued a document entitled "Policy Course in Regard to the Resolution of Territorial Issues" which addressed both the "reversion" of Okinawa and the Ogasawaras, and the "return" of the 'Northern Territories'.

Applying a clear logic, the document sought to work out a cure for the situation featuring the "as yet not realized reversion" of either the 'Northern' or the 'Southern' territories and to break a deadlock of the "not as yet concluded" peace treaties with China and the Soviet Union.

The document claimed that what had caused such a state of affairs as well as the resultant continuous instability of Japan's position in the world was the "U.S.-Japan Security Treaty system". Since, according to the document, there were no prospects for the "return" to Japan of either Okinawa and the Ogasawaras or the "Chishima Islands" as long as the Security Treaty existed, in order to resolve Japan's territorial issues there was nothing left to do but to abolish the "treaty system".

Blaming the LDP government, the JSP Central Executive Committee warned that it was utterly unrealistic to think that the Soviet Union was going to make concessions as long as Japan's military standing continued to strengthen under conditions of the existence of the Security Treaty. According to the document, the LDP government's policy could only "limitlessly" delay the "reversion" of both the 'Southern' and the 'Northern' territories.

The document also asserted that the LDP government was "clinging" to the "irresponsible" policy line of "scattering" illusions among the Japanese people regarding a possibility of the "return" of Kunashiri and Etorofu. The JSP claimed that such a policy "cast a gloomy shadow" not only

over the “return” of the Habomais and Shikotan but also over such “pending bilateral issues” as the Japanese–Soviet economic exchange and safe fishing in the “Northern waters”.

Consequently, the JSP Central Executive Committee proceeded to formulate four basic positions as they applied to conclusion of the Japanese–Soviet peace treaty and the “return” of the ‘Northern Territories’.

The first position spelled out that Kunashiri, Etorofu and the islands located to south of them (the Habomais and Shikotan) had to belong to Japan. As regards Kunashiri and Etorofu, the document claimed that both islands were recognized as the Japanese territory by provisions of the 1855 bilateral agreement. As regards the “Chishimas lying to the north of Uruppu inclusive”, it was indicated that those islands had been appropriated by Japan as a result of the territorial exchange based on provisions of the 1875 Russo–Japanese agreement.

Claiming in addition that neither of the above mentioned two groups of islands had been appropriated “by violence”, the document concluded that together they made up Japan’s “inherent territories”. It was also mentioned separately that the Yalta agreement was not binding on Japan.

The second position was specifically directed against policies of the LDP government. Firstly, calling it a major blunder, the document accused the “reactionary” LDP government of renouncing rights to these islands despite the background described in the first position. Secondly, implying Prime Minister Ikeda’s statement of October 3, the JSP accused the LDP government of changing its previous position in relation to the definition of Kunashiri and Etorofu and reminded about Nishimura Kumao’s official statement on behalf of the government of October 19, 1951.

Thirdly, the document pointed out that the government’s insistent claim that the “Chishima islands” had not been renounced in favor of the Soviet Union was an argument “unacceptable internationally”.

The document’s third position boldly asserted that it was “absolutely impossible” to secure the “return” of the ‘Chishima Islands’ under conditions of the LDP’s continuous policy of strengthening the “Security Treaty system”.

The fourth position put forward by the JSP Central Executive Committee manifested a “two stages approach” to the resolution of the territorial issue. Specifically, the document offered as

“the only realistic means” to secure stability of the Japanese–Soviet relations and contribute to the easing of the international tension in the Far East, striving – as “the first stage measure” – to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union conditional on the “return” to Japan of the Habomais and Shikotan.

Further, the JSP proposed to secure a peaceful “return” of the “Chishima Islands” by carrying on negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding the “return” of Japan’s “inherent territories of the Chishimas” simultaneously with striving for the abolition of the “Security Treaty System”.

According to Uezumi Mutsuhiro, the policy shift embodied in the JSP Central Executive Committee’s document issued in October 1951 was based on the initiative of the then head of the JSP International Department, Wada Hiroo, two members of the Central Executive Committee in charge of national movement, Katsumata Seiichi and Kameda Tokuji, Secretary of the National Movement Bureau, Ito Shigeru, and Head of the National Movement Bureau, Hososako Kane-mitsu.

The approach contained in the “Policy Course in Regard to the Resolution of Territorial Issues” of October 1961 was later confirmed in such major JSP documents as the “Opinion Regarding the Northern Territories Problem” [北方領土問題に対する見解], issued in November 1969 by the JSP’s “Special Committee on Policies Regarding the Japanese–Soviet Issues” [日ソ問題対策特別委員会], and yet another “Opinion Regarding the Northern Territories Problem” issued by the same Committee of the JSP on 24 March, 1972.



孫大川 Ta-chuan Sun (Paelabang Danapan), Minister, Taiwan's Council of Indigenous Peoples, attended the conference



Stage for presentations



Participants visited Taitung County, meeting with representatives of Taiwan's aboriginal tribes