

Textual criticism and exegesis in East Asia and the West : A comparative study

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1. The mid-to-late Tokugawa philology in Confucian studies : Its peculiarities in comparative perspective
2. The reassessment of the Qing scholarship and the Bakumatsu empiricism
3. Intellectual parallelism of *kokugaku* and *Philologie*

The research cluster of Eiji Takemura (Japanese intellectual history), Ito Takayuki (Sinology), and Eto Hiroyuki (history of linguistics) has investigated the c.18th and c.19th development of philological studies among the “evidential Confucians” (考証学派) in China and Japan and also among the Tokugawa “nativists” (国学者), and examined those in conjunction with *Philologie* of Germany in a similar period, namely, that of F. A. Boeckh’s. In the following sections, Takemura examines the evolution of evidential research in c.18th Japan, which is followed by Ito who discusses Qing scholarship in conjunction with the preceding Ming scholarly development. Then Eto compares this East Asian evidential scholarship with the Western philology. The subject matter of this study, namely, the Japanese evidential scholarship of early modern Japan (or Tokugawa period, 1603–1867), falls into the field that has not adequately been covered by the scholars of either Chinese classics or Japanese intellectual history, though both scholarship consciously or unconsciously “practice” sophisticated methods that had evolved from/within this subject matter.*¹

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1. The mid-to-late Tokugawa philology in Confucian studies : Its peculiarities in comparative perspective

The research on the Tokugawa Confucianism has so far been predominantly on *Shushigaku* 朱子学 scholarship, or, so-called ‘Neo-Confucianism’ that had developed in the late-Song China and deployed as ‘national learning’ until 1911 there, and also spread in East Asian states. However, inadequate attention has so far been paid by intellectual historians to an important element of Japanese Confucianism ; an aspect of scholarly development that may be termed “evidential research”. Perhaps with the exception of Benjamin A. Elman, who referred concisely in his articles to the Japanese evidential scholarship of the c.18th, no significant research could be found that covers this element of Japanese Confucianism and its role in scholarly development of modern Japan.

Elman, an esteemed Sinologist specialising in Qing scholarship, argues that the research techniques were “pioneered by” Qing literati and that spilled over into Japan. He emphatically points out, by referring also to Anthony Grafton, that the textual criticism and philological approaches of both countries were “akin” to the role of philology in the emergence of legal, biblical, and historical fields of research in Renaissance and Enlightenment Europe.

To be sure, we identify the development of such Qing evidential scholars as Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613–82), Shu Yizun 朱彝尊 (1629–1709), Yan Ruoju 閻若璩 (1636–1704), famous for his settling of the questions over those forged chapters of *Shangshu* 尚書 (The Book of Documents) in his *Shangshu guwen shuzheng* 尚書古文疏證, and Hui Dong 惠棟 (1697–1758), Wang Ming-sheng 王鳴盛 (1720–97), Dai Zhen 戴震 (1723–77), and Qian Daxin 錢大昕 (1728–1804). Their contributions in promoting the standard of evidential research are worthy of note, and their works were crucial in the development of c.19th Japanese scholarship. The evidential precision and comprehensiveness of Wang Niansun 王念孫 (1744–1832) and his son, Yinzhi 引之 (1766–1834), were duly inherited by Kano Naoki 狩野直喜 (1868–1947), Takeuchi Yoshio 武内義雄 (1886–1966), and other Kyoto Sinologists of the c.20th.

However, it is important to note here that the evidential scholarship up to the mid-Tokugawa period (around 1750) did not derive so much from Qing achievements ; rather, it owed a great deal to the “indigenous” scholarly development among the schools of *Ken'en* 護園 (Sorai) and “classicists” (*kogaku-ha* 古学派) that saw an extensive evolution in the second-half of the c.17th and early c.18th. Further, the year 1736 saw the export of Yamanoi Kanae’s 山井鼎 (1690–1728) *Shichikeimousikoubun* 七經孟子考文 (*Treatise for the Seven Classics* [that are 詩·書·禮·春秋·易·論語·爾雅] and *Mencius*) to China, that

was followed by the export of such books as *Lunyu Yishu* 論語義疏 by Huang Kan 皇侃 (488–545), a text lost in China and was edited by Nemoto Bui 根本武夷 (1699–1764), and *Kongzi Jiayu* 孔氏家語. The reception and the spread of those books initially among Zhejiang literati of the Yangze Delta, the centre of Chinese classical learning, and later in the 1760s among the scholars of Peking and other major cities have already been documented by such late-Meiji scholars as Kano Naoki and Shigeno Yasutsugu, both of whom were indeed empirical Confucians themselves, and the latter subsequently became a modern historian, and by the Kyoto Sinologist Yoshikawa Kojiro 吉川幸次郎 (1904–80) in the c.20th. As is well known, those books were eventually all included in the *Siku quanshu* 四庫全書, though the authenticity of the *kego* 家語 edited and compiled by Dazai Shundai 太宰春台 (1680–1747) was later questioned.

The c.18th evidential scholarship in Japan advanced substantially the qualities of classical philology (and/or ‘textual criticism’), historical chronology, ritual studies, language studies extraordinarily centred around the detailed examination of the Chinese character in classical use, and more. Using Anthony Grafton’s expression, the scholars of the time “assessed manuscript evidence as one to be settled not by seat-of-the-pants navigation but by strict historical reasoning, that served as the basis for textual scholarship” (1991, p.9). Their work “had marked a watershed in the history of classical scholarship: a break between an older, rhetorical style of humanism and a newer, technical philology” (p7).

Amongst the preeminent scholars of the era, Ota Kinjo 大田錦城 (1765–1825) drew heavily on Qing evidential scholarship and the works of his contemporaries in Japan, while Nakai Riken 中井履軒 (1732–1817), even though he was just thirty-three years older than Kinjo, did not seem to have had a chance to get acquainted with the scholarship of his Chinese contemporaries, due entirely to the limited availability of their work in Japan at his time. Nevertheless, while Riken’s ideas consisted less in the invention of wholly new methods, his work exhibits originalities grounded on his sound evidential expertise, and, unlike his Chinese contemporaries, displays highly independent and objective attitudes, *rarely* affected by the then dominant political and other biases.

The Japanese evidential scholars active in the first-half of the c.19th, to name but a few, Matsuzaki Kodo 松崎慊堂 (1771–1844), Kariya Ekisai 狩谷掖斎 (1775–1835), Yasui Sokken 安井息軒 (1799–1876), and Tojo Ichido 東条一堂 (1778–1857), were vigorous in adopting the increasingly influential Qing evidential scholarship 清代考據學, that saw a massive evolution in Qianlong 乾隆 (1736–1795) and Jiaqing 嘉慶 (1796–1820) periods. On the other hand, Yasui Sokken’s detailed study of *Lunyu* (論語揖疏) and Tojo Ichido’s 老子王注 (*Wang’s Notes for Lao-tsu*) were received in late-Imperial China with considerable respect toward

the mid-nineteenth century.

So, it was not a “one-way” influx of “advanced” methods from China to Japan, but, rather an intellectual reciprocity that nurtured scholarship on both sides of East China Sea. Further, we may have to distinguish the ‘standard’ of textual criticism and the degree of scholarly “independence”, especially from the then dominant political and ideological biases: Ito Jinsai 伊藤仁斎 (1627–1705) attacked the influence of Buddhist and Dao thoughts on Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) Neo-Confucianism, nearly a hundred years before Dai Zhen massively attacked it in China (Yoshikawa, 1969). Nakai Riken displayed highly critical study of *Shangshu*, Yamamoto Hokuzan 山本北山 (1752–1812) was well acquainted with Qing evidential findings of the *Shu*, and the works of his contemporaries in Japan, but he not only drew heavily on Qing findings but fiercely attacked them, especially the works of Wang Ming-sheng, Yan Ruojun, and other preeminent Chinese evidential scholars, who have excelled in the study of *Shangshu* in Qing China.

Takeuchi Yoshio, a renowned Kyoto Sinologist of the twentieth century, advocates that textual criticism had never grown into the full-scale one in Qing China; while their archival and bibliographical expertise, and their exegetical (訓詁) sophistication were not in question, they remained so reserved in perceiving the Canons too “sacred” to criticise, and remained submissive to them (Takeuchi, 1939). He continued that their textual criticism was ‘harnessed’ by (刺戟された) the arrival of Yamanoi’s *Treatise for the Seven Classics and Mencius* in 1736 to China. 1736 was the first year of Qianlong, which, along with the immediately following era of Jiaqing, were considered, as stated, the “golden age” of Qing scholarship.

The Qing China evidential scholars had to live in politically-restricted circumstances even in those “golden era”, according to Yoshida Jun and Kinoshita Tetsuya, Kyoto scholars of the present day. They criticise Elman for his too optimistic the supposition of the circumstances that surrounded the Chinese evidential scholars: Provided such political oppression as *moji no goku* 文字の獄 (literary imprisonment), and various other means of political oppression imposed on scholars of China one after another, the scholars had never enjoyed “free” study of classic texts.

Furthermore, there has been a long and persistent conflict between the “New Text School” and “Old Text School”, the conflict that dates back as far as to BC1 so. There has also been the rivalry between Neo-Confucian scholars and so-called “classicists”: Neo-Confucianism, or “Zhu Xi School of Song Confucianism” that evolved in the second half of c.11th, adopted the then predominant Buddhist and Dao ideas and cultivation methods, though they fiercely criticised Buddhism and Daoism at superficial level. The “classicist”

Confucians in China, which saw a massive evolution roughly from the mid-c.18th, was against this “Buddhism-influenced” Confucianism, but, their criticism gradually toned down as the time progressed, due largely to political reasons. Esteemed evidential scholars such as Wang Ming-sheng and Qian Daxin demonstrate expertise in textual criticism of *Shangshu* text, the oldest of Chinese Canons, but, one cannot deny the degree of influence of the then political situation in their tones of textual criticism ; it becomes even more apparent when compared with their predecessors such as Shu Yizun and Yan Ruoju, arguably the pioneers of Qing evidential research, and the Japanese scholars such as Nakai Riken and Yamamoto Hokuzan.

As stated, the modern evidential scholarship in Japan is in large part the product of an intellectual reciprocity between the both sides of East China Sea, particularly the academic exchange between the evidential Confucians of Japan and China. Another important point to note is the degree of independence of “scholarly judgment”, particularly, the independence from political influences ; and, in this respect, China and Japan seem to differ considerably.

The Japanese historians mentioned earlier, Shigeno Yasutsugu and Kume Kunitake, were Confucians specialised in evidential scholarship and textual criticism. Kume carried out an intensive textual criticism of the oldest of the Chinese Canons, *Shangshu*, with the then freshly arrived massive collection of Chinese Classics 皇清經解. Shigeno was a foremost evidential Confucian in pre-modern Japan, who excelled in textual criticism and historical chronology.

As such, they have accumulated preeminent academic skills such as classical philology (and/or ‘textual criticism’), historical chronology, ritual studies, and linguistic approaches to texts, before the arrival of Western historiography ; all of which are crucially important genres of modern historical research. The methods brought into Japan when Ludwig Riess (1861–1928) was appointed the first history scholar of Tokyo Imperial University was adopted on those well-established methodological bases.

2. The reassessment of the Qing scholarship and the Bakumatsu empiricism

The Qing empiricism is arguably the culmination of the long, complicated, nonetheless, ever-lasting evolutionary process of Confucian scholarly methods in China that started roughly in the former-Han period (BC2–1). It affected the neighbouring scholarship that included the one in Japan, and was indeed the chief methodological ingredient of the so-called “Kyoto Sinology” 京都支那学 of modern Japan. This Qing-derived Kyoto Confucian-

ism had long been taken for granted as “standard” Confucian scholarship, and, for this very reason, it tended to have been perceived merely as a “method” rather than a scholarship that involves philosophy and the study of ideas. Meiji “philosophers” such as Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 (1856–1944) had turned to Sung and Ming Confucianism, for they believed that those were more compatible with, or, familiar to, Western philosophy and the history of ideas. However, the recent studies by Yu Ying-shih 余英時, Benjamin A. Elman, Kai-wing Chou 周啓榮, Chen Zuwu 陳祖武, and Chang So-an 張壽安 present a different picture. Further, the recent Japanese intellectual currents vividly illustrate the reflection of late-Ming scholarly achievements within Qing empiricism, elements of peculiar Confucian metaphysics that are different from those of Sung and early-Ming, and even inclination toward pragmatism among Qing scholars that has until recently been considered rather alien to the empiricist scholarship of the era. The author would rather argue that the stereotypical image of Qing empiricism is the projected perception that was envisaged by the Meiji empiricist scholars. This section attempts to shed light on the so-called ideology and politics of the literary criticism of *Shangshu* 尚書 (The Book of Documents) during the Qing Period, for which the above inferences should be taken as circumstantial proof. In doing so, this report aims to make some hypothetical and corroborative proposals regarding several differences between the empirical achievements of Edo-Tokugawa Japan and the methodology and orientation of empiricism in Qing China, as shown in the Take-mura paper.

A vast thematic variety has been covered in research on literary criticism of Confucian classics. It is widely recognised that the authenticity of *Guwen Shangshu* 古文尚書 (the Old Text Book of Documents, the Old Text Chapters) has presented an especially contested issue. The works of Yoshida Jun are most suitable for further reference as he has put forward insightful and persuasive arguments on this topic. It is crucial to address discrepancies in understandings of the sceptical attitudes towards Confucius’s works. To read this scepticism as an iconoclasm, i.e., to claim that it deprives the Confucian classics of their authority and removes them from their revered position, would be an apparent misunderstanding.

Additionally, in the various attitudes towards the Confucian classics held by thinkers and scholars of the time, or in their avoidance of taking a stance, one can discern their sense of ‘order’ and their predilection towards it. The tendency to be sceptical of the origins of the Confucian classics in recent years is considered a sign of progress for literary criticism. Moreover, research aiming to understand these implied ideological intentions internally is being vigorously pursued by Taiwanese scholars such as Lin Ching-chang 林慶

彰。

Yen Ruoqu's 閻若璩 (1636–1704) shocking *Shang-shu ku-wen shu-cheng* 尚書古文疏證 (*Evidential analysis of the Old Text Documents*) caused a major sensation, when it was finally published posthumously in 1745. At the time, considerable advances were being made in text-critical studies of Confucian classics such as the *Old Text the Book of Documents*, but at the same time a cautious status quo stance towards classical studies could also be quite widely observed among contemporary scholars, including Li Gong 李塉 (1659–1733), who abhorred the sceptical questioning of the authenticity of Confucian classics, and I too have on previous occasions briefly discussed its significance. First, Yan Ruoqu raised some important questions about the reliability of the *Old Text of the Book of Documents* in his *Shangshu guwen shuzheng* 尚書古文疏證 in response to which Mao Qiling 毛奇齡 (1623–1716) wrote a refutation entitled *Guwen Shangshu yuanci* 古文尚書冤詞 included in the *Xihe heji* 西河合集, and it is well-known that Li Gong contributed a preface to this latter work.

On the key point of the “mind of man and the mind of Tao” (人心道心) passage in the *Ta Yü mo* 大禹謨 chapter, Mao Qiling (毛奇齡) challenged Yen's demonstration that this passage was lifted from the *Hsun-tzu* 荀子 by writing “Moreover, although the *Hsun-tzu* contains the *jen-hsin Tao-hsin* 人心道心 passage, *Hsun-tzu* is in fact citing the text of *Shangshu* 尚書 (the Classic of Documents). It is not a case of the Classic citing the *Hsun-tzu*”. Mao took the Yen's attack on the “Old Text” (古文) chapters as an affront to the “sacred Classics” 聖經. Elman emphatically point out, that these debates reveal precision and commitment to detail that lay at the heart of the scholarly debates of the age. Standing on opposite sides of the Old Text chapters issue, both Yen and Mao were committed to the use of empirical criteria to prove their claims. Moreover beneath the difference in conclusions lay a unity of methodology and discourse (Elman, 1984).

However, the most important to note here is that there were scholars critical of excessive scepticism; that included denunciation of *Shangshu* 尚書 (the Classic of Documents), questioning of their authenticity. In Mao Ch'i-ling's *Guwen Shangshu yuanci*, he presents the following account by Ch'en Ti 陳弟 (1541–1617) of the Ming Dynasty era. Incidentally, Yoshida regards this as “a pragmatic opinion” (Yoshida, 2007, pp.30–31).

“People respect the authentic Book of Documents because it contains the proper standards for moral behaviour, and they despise forgeries because their content is not suitable for instruction. However, finding fault in the details of wording without maintaining the true spirit of *Guwen Shangshu* taking one's inquiry too far”. (*Shangshu shuyan* 尚書疏衍 Volume 1)

Furthermore, Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610–1695), who asserted that the ‘mind of man and the mind of Tao’ verse of the *Ta Yü Mo* 大禹謨 chapter led to Hsun-tzu’s view on humanity as fundamentally flawed, has also initially expressed his hesitation in regarding the text as inauthentic. The following discussion effectively paraphrases the aforementioned.

Huang Taichong 黃太沖 (宗羲) once said, The sayings of the sages do not rest on their phraseology but on their ethical principles. If there are no flaws in their ethical principles, then [faulty] phraseology does no harm. There are some who take issue with sayings such as that concerning the human mind and moral mind in 大禹謨 (Counsels of the Great Yu)”, but how could this have been forged after the Three Dynasties 三代 (Xia, Shang, and Zhou) ? (Words of Huang Zongxiq quoted in Yan Ruoqu’s *Shangshu guwen shuzheng* 8.119)

Furthermore, those scholars like Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613–82) continued to adopt a duplicitous and inconsistent attitude. Nonetheless, we can catch a glimpse of their views on ‘order’ and the Classical Studies in their indecisive and conservative attitudes themselves. From the following argument, we can see that he refrains from passing judgment, pushing aside the problem itself without any deep literary consideration.

That being so, the current the *Book of Documents* consists of the thirty-three chapters found in both the New Text and the Old Text, interspersed with the texts of Fu Sheng 伏生 and Kong Anguo 孔安國. to which have been added twenty-five chapters originating with Mei Ze 梅賾 and the twenty-eight characters of the *Shun Dian* 舜典 (Canon of Shun) originating with Yao Fangxing 姚方興 to form a single work. Mencius 孟子 said, “If one believed everything in the *Book of Documents*, it would have been better for the *Book of Documents* not to have existed at all” (*Mencius* VII.B.3), and today the evidence for this is even greater. (Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, *Rizhilu* 日知錄 2, *Guwen Shangshu* 古文尚書)

As for Li Guangdi 李光地 (1642–1718), he acknowledged that the very questions regarding both the Old Text chapters and the New Text chapters, were in a sense inevitable, and that Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) had also admitted to holding such suspicions :

Arguments about the Old Text (古文) and the New Text (今文) are many, and even Zhu Xi had doubts about this. . . . vilification by scholars in recent years has been partic-

ularly excessive. But most of what they say is not worth discussing. I would say that such indeed is the doubting of antiquity by later scholars. . . . This book was already circulating for four hundred years during the Han dynasty, and it became increasingly difficult to modify it. (Li Guangdi 李光地, *Rongcunji* 榕村集 17, Shangshu gujinwen bian 尚書古今文辨).

As has already been most aptly noted by Yoshida (2007), one can discern in the seemingly conservative indecision, suspension of judgement, and vacillation of the above writers an eminently cautious and prudent attitude that sought to suppress an excessively sceptical trend that threatened to undermine the very foundations of classical studies with its allegations of forgeries and to restore a certain balance to the discussion.

In other words, the main issue caused by the appearance of the *Shangshu guwen shuzheng* at that time was the contradiction between two currents of thought : preserving the ‘Confucian Classics as we have them now’ as opposed to constructing Classical Studies in pursuit of “the Confucian Classics as they should be” (Yoshida, 2007, p. 46). In this sense, their seemingly-conservative attitudes can rather be seen as an extremely realistic choice which stems from the intention of avoiding unnecessary confusion.

In connection with the passage on *renxin* 人心 (the human mind) and *daoxin* 道心 (the moral mind) in 大禹謨 (Counsels of the Great Yu), which was seen as problematic by Yan Ruoqu (閻若璩) in his *Shangshu guwen shuzheng*, I would like to add that not only was this related to the textual criticism of the *Old Text Book of History*, but in one respect it also squares with the fact that the Neo-Confucian dualistic understanding of the structure of the *xin* 心 (mind) in terms of its original or ideal nature and its actual state was progressively questioned and eventually negated in the midst of tendencies in the contemporary context of the history of thought towards the inseparability of *li* 理 (moral principles) and *qi* 氣 (pneuma, vital energy) and the monism of *qizhi zhi xing* 氣質之性 (physical nature), or the physical aspect of human nature, in ontology and theories of human nature.

It would seem that Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 too feared that this sort of discourse could at times tie in with the *shingaku* 心學 (study of mind) in a bad sense. But this perception *per se* has an underlying commonality with his misgivings that “Classical studies is what the study of principles was called in antiquity. . . . Chan studies is what the study of principles is called today” (古之所謂理學、經學也。 . . . 今之所謂理學、禪學也 [Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, *Tinglin wenji* 亭林文集 3, *Yu Shi Yushan shu* 與施愚山書 (Letter to Shi Yushan 施愚山)] , and as was noted earlier, his position, contrary to that of Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲, was one with

somewhat conservative nuances close to that of Li Gong 李塉 and Li Guangdi 李光地 in that he recognised the traditional, orthodox significance of classical studies and the value of their existence and aligned himself with a status quo stance towards classical studies.

In conclusion, for the better or for the worse, Qing empiricism has many aspects which cannot be discussed on equal terms with neutral methodologies and scholarship without value judgement in their contemporary sense. This neutral methodology reflects the sophisticated political judgment and ideological tint of the scholar-bureaucrats who made Confucianism the national doctrine. Therefore, we should consider the various historical and social factors when making comparisons with Japan and its relatively developed empirical literary criticism, and when analysing the different degrees of modernisation between the two countries.

3. Intellectual parallelism of *kokugaku* and *Philologie*

In late c.17th Japan, *kangaku* 漢学 (Chinese study) and *rangaku* 蘭学 (Dutch study) thrived through rigorous language study and textual criticism with the purpose of accurate understanding of Chinese classics and Dutch literature. Against such an intellectual trend, a fierce nativist reaction emerged as *kokugaku* 国学 (national learning) movement in c.18th Japan. Provoked and stimulated by the existence of the *kangaku* school, *kokugaku* scholars rejected all that was Chinese and insisted on a return to *inishie gokoro* 古意 (original Japanese ways of thinking) from *karagokoro* 漢意 (Chinese ways of thinking) with the aim of refuting the claims of Chinese influence and re-evaluate things Japanese.

Nonetheless, it is an unignorable, significant fact that *kokugaku* scholars were strongly influenced by Tokugawa Classicist Confucians in their methodology of language analysis and text interpretation. In order to identify traditional value of Japanese mentality and morality, they followed the examples of *kangaku* scholars' academic rigor and devoted themselves to scrutinizing ancient writings by elucidating the original meaning of each word and interpreting the whole text as precisely as possible. Their inductive method in the studies of Japanese classical literature, together with that of the *kangaku* scholars', provided a model of language and cultural studies, notably in the sphere of descriptive linguistics in Japan, for many succeeding generations of scholars until the Meiji era.

In order to understand what ancient people really felt, perceived, and recognised, *kokugaku* scholars scrutinised the words conveyed by those people and assembled later in a written form. Their concern was re-experiencing and empathising the reality and lived experience of ancient people, and their method was analysing texts in a linguistic and in-

terpretative way.

This approach indicating academic integrity and rigor can be comparable to that of European humanists after Renaissance, particularly of c.19th German philologists. To put it another way, the attitude toward and the procedure of studying ancient writings and the true ancient way held by *kokugaku* scholars well deserves to be called “philological”. Those scholars can be identified with “philologists”, and what they pursued can be regarded as a sort of “philology”.

Philology, which was born as a branch of learning in Ptolemaic Egypt in the Hellenistic period (323–30 BC), had long been regarded as a method of learning that focussed on studying ancient texts in the original and appraised them through not so much speculation as empirical evidence. Between the late c.18th and the early c.19th, particularly in the German speaking region, philology shifted gradually from an art of learning to a science aiming at a systematic inquiry into “understanding” what was recognised by human mind. As one of the most important forerunners of this field is Friedrich August Wolf (1759–1824), who attempted to systematise philology as a science to grasp the whole of knowledge of ancient Greeks and Romans that encompassed language, literature, culture, art, thought, religion, etc. The main purpose of Wolf’s philology was to understand and re-experience “things” and “events” of the classical world. Thus, he confined his study to *Altertumswissenschaft*, or the study of classical antiquity.

Then philology came to be applied to a broader sphere of humane studies. It was August Boeckh (1785–1867), a successor of Wolf and a disciple of Friedrich von Schleiermacher, who reorganised Wolf’s philology to give it a clearer definition and a more systematised method. Boeckh considered philology not merely as a study of classical literature or languages, but as an inquiry into “the recognition of what is produced by the human mind, i.e., what is recognised” (1877, p.10). Philologists do not have to philosophise like Plato or produce literary works like Shakespeare, but they need to understand and explain Plato’s thoughts and Shakespeare’s writings in a comprehensive and holistic way. The ultimate concern of philologists lied in *Erkennen des Erkannten*, i.e., recognizing and re-experiencing what was recognised in human mind. This must not be limited, according to Boeckh, to classical antiquity, but applied to every cultural phenomenon. To achieve this goal, Boeckh systematised the method of philology, which attempted to encompass the whole facts (*Realien*) of a nation such as annals, geography, political history, protocols ; metrological system, economic history, social history ; rituals, religion, history of art ; mythology, history of philosophy, intellectual history, literary history, language history. Collection and interpretation of such voluminous materials from each of these fields enables us to recognise

and re-experience what was recognised in human mind.

Most materials mentioned above can be obtained as a text in a written form. Philologists must and can, among other things, read and understand the language of the texts as precisely as possible, which is why language learning is the first and foremost propriety in this discipline. But, as already mentioned, the true task of philology is to understand and interpret what is written in a text and to re-experience what was experienced by human minds distant in space and time. Important and crucial as it is, the study of language was just one way to this goal.

Philology, from the viewpoint of Wolf and Boeckh, was a discipline of “understanding”. Wolf confined it to antiquity, but Boeckh applied it to various nations of various ages and attempted to grasp the whole of the nation. As a result, the theory and practice of Boeckh’s philology provided a methodological framework to Germanistik, or the study of the German nation, and had a profound impact to other disciplines in humanities, particularly in philosophy (e.g., Dilthey’s hermeneutics), historical and cultural studies.

Such “philological” approaches for studying ancient writings emerged in a particular period of the Japanese intellectual history. Those approaches were established and fostered by *kangaku* scholars of the Edo period and then by *kokugaku* scholars. Among *kokugaku* scholars, the academic achievements and attitude of Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長 (1730–1801) deserve special attention. Influenced by his predecessors such as Keichu 契沖 (1640–1701) and Ogyu Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666–1728), Norinaga conceived ideas of a philologically oriented investigation of ancient Japanese language and literature and, during his lifetime, published voluminous books (more than 90 titles and 260 volumes). These are characterised by his rigorous philological approach with recognition of the emotional nature of man and a profound sense of reverence for Shinto mythology.

Among other features, Norinaga was a linguist devoting himself to an analytical study of classical Japanese. His publication of this field includes Sino-Japanese comparative phonology, a correlation of Chinese ideograms and Japanese phonetic symbols, the use of grammatical particles in the classics, etc., all of which are distinguished by his careful inductive method and his passion to seek linguistic model in the early classics.

Norinaga’s aim, however, was to re-evaluate the peculiarity and preeminence of Japanese thought and culture. For this purpose, he discerned the identity of Japanese culture through an intensive study of the ancient classics such as *Kojiki* 古事記 (Record of ancient matters) and *Genjimonogatari* 源氏物語. In order to penetrate into the world of such classical texts, he adapted an approach to read and scrutinise them precisely word by word and tried to understand intuitively what they went through. In *Kojikiden* 古事記伝 (Study

of *Kojiki*), Norinaga's greatest achievement completed in 1798, three years before his death, he succeeded in not only showing how to read the text of *Kojiki* written in Chinese script, as phonetic signs for *yamato-kotoba* 大和言葉, but also explicating the ancient Japanese system of morality.

Immediately after the publication of *Kojikiden*, Norinaga brought a small work into existence. *Uiyamabumi* うひ山ふみ (The First Mountain Climber) was a guide book for young students written in an informal manner to show the fundamental attitude and knowledge to start classical studies. Short as it is, this small booklet best reveals his view of classical leaning.

Here Norinaga made a succinct definition of *kogaku* 古学 (classical leaning) as a study that is independent of all the latter-day theories and attempts to seek out the ultimate origin of things by directly examining the classical texts and learning about antiquity in detail. To avoid arbitrary interpretations and commentaries that had obscured the original meaning, it is vitally important to elucidate the true meaning of words in the texts by speculating on what the authors and poets went through. That is why Norinaga insisted that *kokugaku* students should value *kogaku-no-me* 古学の目 (eyes for classics).

As stated before, in order to understand what ancient people recognised, it is one and only best way to go as far back as possible to the original sources and to read the ancient texts in minute detail with annotation, and finally to come close to and grasp intuitively the world and reality that the ancient people experienced. According to Norinaga, without complete knowledge of the ancient language, it is impossible to grasp classical ways of thinking : without complete knowledge of classical ways of thinking, it is impossible to identify the traditional value of Japanese mentality and morality.

Like Boeckh's philological inquiry, language learning forms foundation of classic studies. And this must be based on the premise that language, mind (classical thinking), and action (mentality and morality) are closely related and, more or less, identical. In this regard Norinaga commented as follows : "Words, behavior, and mind generally coincide in all human beings. For example, a wise person is wise in words and behavior alike : a dull person is dull in words and behavior. Also, men think, speak, and behave in a manly way, while women think, speak, and behave in a womanly way" (Nishimura, 1987, pp. 475-476).

He mentions here that *kotoba to waza to kokoro* 言と事と心 (words, behaviour, and mind) are interrelated and interlined, which means that he identified language with action and mind. From this perspective, it follows that language study explains people's action and thought. The view can be applied to diachronic phenomena. Norinaga continues in the following way :

This also applies to the differences in historical periods. The words, behavior, and mind of ancient people are by definition those of remote antiquity. Those of middle antiquity are those of middle antiquity, and those of later ages have their own later manner. The words, behavior, and mind of people are similar within their respective categories. In the present era, if you wish to study the words, behavior, and mind of the ancient people, their words are found in poetry, and their behavior, in historical writings. There is no way of recording history except in words; similarly, the nature of people's minds may be known through poetry. Since words, behavior, and mind coincide, what you need to know in later years about the mind and behavior of the ancient people and the conditions of their society is preserved in ancient words and ancient poetry. (Nishimura, 1987, p.476)

This reveals Norinaga's view of language as well as his fundamental attitude towards classical study. He did not confine the idea that words, behaviour, and mind generally coincide in all human beings to a certain period of time, but extended it beyond time. This enable us to understand ancient people's thought and action (behaviour), and to re-experience what was experienced by them, from scrutiny of words described in a classical text. It is this perspective that ensures methodological validity of Norinaga's classical learning.

The distinctive features of Norinaga's approach with considerable influence of *kangaku* scholars parallels that of Boeckh's philology in their thorough reading and interpreting texts based on language study. By way of scrutinizing the pure form of language and experiencing the mind of people in question, both *kokugaku* and German philology began to emphasise the value of untainted and unfertilised national spirit by the foreign influence. The aim of language study for them was not so much as elucidation of the nature of language in a speculative and metaphysical way, but identification and evaluation of their own national identity and their own tradition and culture.

A c.19th German philologist, Hoffmann von Fallersleben (1798–1874) defined German philology (die deutsche Philologie) as “the study of spiritual life of German nation from the point of linguistic and literary study” (1836, p.v) From this viewpoint, Norinaga's *kokugaku* can be interpreted as “Japanese philology” aiming at the study of spiritual life of Japanese nation from the point of linguistic and literary study.

The similarity of Norinaga's academic attitude to that of German philologists' was already been indicated by Japanologists of the Meiji period. At the turn of the last century, Haga Yaichi 芳賀矢一 (1867–1927) had already identified *kokugaku* with German philology of c.19th. He proposed an idea of “Japanese philology” based on theory and method of Ger-

man philology in order to provide a solid academic basis for *kokugogaku* or *kokubungaku* as an independent study and to understand fundamental characters of Japanese people through interpreting texts written in Japanese. Inspired by Haga's such suggestion, Muraoka Tsunetsugu 村岡典嗣 (1884–1946) re-evaluated Norinaga's *Kokugaku* as identical in nature with German philology, or *Alttertumswissenschaft*.

Their insight results from their profound and comprehensive knowledge both of Japanese classics and of novel learning of humanities from Europe. They attempted to apply theory and practice of philology to studies of Japanese literature and establish “new *kokugaku*” to reform and reframe the traditional discipline, because they realised intuitively conceptual and methodological parallels between *kokugaku* and philology. But their endeavour seems to have been forgotten along with the term “philology”.

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