現代韓国における多文化主義と幸福

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Abstract:
今日の韓国において多文化主義はどのような位相で進んでいるかを、フィールドワークと理論的分析に基づき考察する。政策立案にかかわる専門家や研究者によれば、韓国の多文化政策は移住民の同化や統合に比重が置かれ、多文化主義というよりはナショナリズムの延長上に位置づけたほうが正当な評価だといえる。移住民の声は、多文化政策の矛盾をさらに厳しく告発している。しかし、さまざまな市民運動や文化運動の進展により、韓国社会が多文化社会に向けて前進していることも否定できない。そうした試行錯誤の軌跡を理論的に捉えるとしたら、多文化主義よりはナショナリズムの一環として位置づけたほうが的確であり、とりわけL. グリーンフェルドの「ナショナリズム三部作」は示唆的な手がかりとなる。それによれば、ネーションの基礎である世俗的平等の観念が社会を流動化させ、それは一面で活気のある発展をもたらすが、他面では存在論的不安に満ちた社会的アノミーをもたらす。この図式を韓国に当てはめたとき、ナショナリズムは集団的凝集力と急速な経済成長を実現したが、同時にアノミーの蔓延をもたらしてきたという近現代の歴史理解に適合的であるといえる。これは換言すると、GDP は高いが GNH（幸福度）は低いという東アジアの先進地域に共通する「逆説」を説明するものでもある。こうして俯瞰した場合、移住民から見た幸福の問題、および多文化社会の未来がもたらす幸福の可能性は、文明論的にきわめて大きな意味を持つといえる。
さらなる探求に向け、3点を指摘しておきたい。1）東アジアの現実を、ナショナリズムから多文化主義への移行という図式から理解するのでは無理がある。ナショナリズムは、今でも社会的現実を構築する主要なモデルであり、それは近代化の基礎になるとともに、平等な市民権の母胎ともなる。しかし、同時に東アジアを不幸な社会にしてきた面もある。2）東アジアにおける多文化主義は、ナショナリズムの延長として理解すべきである。しかし、ナショナリズムそのものが永遠に「未完のプロジェクト」であり、移住民の排除と包摂はその軌道に予測不能な影響を与えている。3）移住民を送り出す東南アジアや南アジアの国々と、受け入れる側の東アジアの先進地域との不均衡な関係についてさらに考えていく必要がある。それは新たな植民地主義であるといえるが、他方で移住民の声にホスト社会が耳を傾けるようになれば、ナショナリズムがもたらしたアノミー、不幸を和らげる可能性もある。

Keywords: happiness, multiculturalism, South Korea, L. Greenfeld, nationalism
キーワード: 幸福、多文化主義、韓国、L. グリーンフェルド、ナショナリズム
1. From monocultural to multicultural policies

Multiculturalism and happiness—this may sound like a queer combination. Both are ambiguous and controversial concepts. I am not yet sure if my probing can lead to any solid and productive solutions. However, I believe it is worthwhile to raise questions concerning this relationship, if we look at reality and consider the modern history of East Asia.

Multiculturalism has two ambivalent faces. On one hand, it is an extension of nationalism. On the other hand, it is a new model for future society. In many actual situations, the former supersedes the latter. This tendency can be observed in East Asia and even among nations of immigrants like Australia as well.

The multicultural policy is said to have started in Canada and Australia in the 1970s. There is a basic presumption that liberal views will promote this radical change from nationalism to a more tolerant and open social construction. However, there are many skeptics who criticize such liberal orientation of multiculturalism. Here I would like to mention the view of Ghassan Hage, a Lebanese-Australian anthropologist. His criticism against Australian multiculturalism is very harsh. According to Hage, multicultural tolerance is nothing but an extension of Australian nationalism, which reproduces a fantasy of White supremacy. He states, “many of those who position themselves as multicultural and anti-racists are merely deploying a more sophisticated fantasy of White supremacy” (Hage 2000: 23). His critical view is becoming all the more persuasive in today’s situation where we witness an “Australia first” phenomenon. Although I am not totally convinced by his criticism, I think it deserves close consideration in order to help understand the reality of East Asian society from this perspective.

In East Asia, where nationalism is still a dominant political ideology, multiculturalism remains an item of political lip service for the nation-state. However, in the process of globalization involving local society and people, many countries in this region are beginning to recognize the necessity of the ideological shift from assimilationism to multiculturalism. South Korea presents a good example of the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism. This case study is a step toward future comparative research in East Asia.

The continuity and discontinuity from the colonial regime to the postcolonial one is a key element. As Japan colonized Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and other areas, the nation came to encompass a more comprehensive category beyond ethnic differences. Japan needed an ideology that could rationalize nationalistic solidarity on one hand, and colonial expansion on the other hand. Thus, the state should predominate over ethnic identity. “八紘一宇,” or “all the world under one roof,” was a political slogan that was popular from the Second Sino-Japanese War until World War II. Just before the end of the World War II, 6.9 million Japanese resided in the colonies, and 2.5 million non-Japanese resided in Japan (Watt 2010). The Empire of Japan was definitely a multicultural society.
Reflecting on this history, it is easy to point out the hypocrisy of this regime. Although the non-Japanese people were incorporated into the same Japanese nation, they were treated and discriminated as non-Japanese. They were included and excluded at the same time. At the end of the war, most of the Japanese people in the ex-colonies were forced to move back to Japan. The Taiwanese, Chinese, and Korean residents were deprived of their Japanese nationality, and they had to choose either to go back to their country of origin or stay in Japan as ethnic minorities. Therefore, multiculturalism and colonialism were terms that were interchangeable with nationalism, and multiculturalism could be easily dissolved into nationalism as the situation changed.

The Japanese colonial domination of Korea, which began in 1910, induced a sharp contrast to nation building for Korean intellectuals. They sought a different type of nationalism with emphasis on ethnic identity, rather than on the state of which they had been deprived by Japan. In other words, Korea developed ethnic nationalism, while Japan developed state nationalism. This characterization has yielded significant impacts even in the postcolonial period in regarding conceptualization and formation of the nation.

During the colonial period, Korea achieved social and economic development based on the collaboration between the colonists and the colonized. Although some historians—both Korean and non-Korean—admit this fact, it has been totally erased from the official history in postcolonial Korea. Those collaborators have been called “親日,” or “pro-Japan: they were criticized, accused as traitors, and sometimes even executed. The purge was much harsher in North Korea than in South Korea; in actuality, South Korea continued collaborating with Japan, even more so since the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1965, and also found a new supporter in the US, which was generous enough to aid them in their Cold War efforts. One of the major reasons for the sharp contrast between wealthy South Korea and impoverished North Korea comes from the difference of the actual collaboration with foreign powers. However, at least on an ideological level, both countries share the same kind of nationalism based on ethnic purity, so the gap between the idea and the real has presented a great dilemma to South Korea.

On the other hand, as South Korea developed not only economically but also socially and culturally, particularly since the 1990s, a different stream emerged. As I mentioned, there were many foreign residents in the colonial period: at least 700,000 Japanese and 200,000 Chinese. However, the great majority of Japanese were forced to move back, and most Chinese were also pushed to leave, due to the escalation of ethnic nationalism, with the result that there were only 20,000 Chinese residents living in South Korea in the early 1990s. Postcolonial South Korea was one of the most homogenous states in the world, both in terms of actuality and ideology.

After that, however, the 1997 financial crisis in particular pushed South Korea to transform itself radically to survive in global competition. President Kim Dae-jung, a former rival of Park Chung-hee, decided to reopen the country at the global standard and resolutely
restructured the economic system, and the number of foreign residents has increased since then.

There are basically two new streams of migrants that did not exist before: migrant brides and migrant workers. Migrant brides are comprised of young Asian women who are agency-matched with Korean men who could not otherwise find local brides. Migrant workers, usually male, were invited to satisfy the demand for unskilled labor in small factories. Most of them have come from China and Southeast Asia, but they belong to different categories. The former group (Asian women) is expected to assimilate into the Korean society. “Multicultural family” is the phrase coined to indicate this new phenomenon: there exists a wide range of support including language-learning and therapy to help these women become “Korean.” The latter group of migrant workers, however, is expected to go “home” after several years of contribution.

Although the term “multicultural” has been mobilized to describe the new trend of immigration policies, there is a huge gap between idea and reality. “Assimilationism” or “integration” is a more appropriate term to describe the treatment of migrant brides, yet migrant workers have been totally excluded from the target of the nation formation. Here we see the same duality of nationalization of foreigners, included and excluded, as in colonial Japan. Due to the legacy of ethnic nationalism, many negative phenomena have been observed, including crude discrimination, abuse, underpayment, and so forth. Migrant workers endeavored to unite with certain Korean activists to fight against human rights violations. Today, there are many groups and movements that represent the cultural presence and equal rights of these workers in society. These workers also have the support of the government and of grassroots movements, but the likelihood their obtaining equal citizenship is extremely low.

What distinguishes colonial and postcolonial multiculturalism? There are many differences in politico-economic factors. Primarily, the position of Korean people was radically transformed from that of the colonized to the colonist. Broadly speaking, though, today’s multicultural endeavor in South Korea is a reenactment of its past colonial history: only the location of supremacy has changed. At the same time, there are some signs that suggest a different future model. We need to look at the current reality in a more dynamic and microscopic way to seek this question.

2. State and society

I conducted many interviews with specialists and intellectuals who have engaged in multicultural policies in South Korea. These individuals have degrees from Western universities and share liberal views of multiculturalism: they tend to look at the Korean way of multiculturalism in a rather critical way. A sociologist of migration, Prof. Yoon In-Jin, said as follows:
I agree that multiculturalism is an ambiguous term, so migrant integration would be a more preferable one. If you observe social interests, goals, and orientation in South Korea, you will notice that integration is a more appropriate word to describe the reality. The government policies focus on integration and assimilation of migrants, rather than fusion and coexistence of different cultures. Multiculturalism remains to be a kind of rhetoric in South Korea. Not only the government but also the nation holds the same creed — Migrant workers should go home after they work for a few years and contribute to the Korean economy; migrant brides came to become Korean, so they should learn Korean language and culture, and assimilate themselves to raise a family. Nevertheless, people tend to talk about multiculturalism and multicultural society, because they believe such terms sound progressive, cosmopolitan, politically correct, and ideal. [Feb 23, 2016]

Two researchers from the IOM (International Organization for Migration) Migration Research and Training Centre testified as to the difficulty of their mission. The Centre is an independent institution, but affiliated with and funded by the Ministry of Justice. It is committed the social integration of migrants and the nation from a neutral perspective. These researchers seek academic evidence for their work, but sometimes feel anxious about the possibility of providing evidence biased toward the government side. Their present concern is for Korean immigrants from China, rather than the migrant workers. These immigrants are descendants of the Korean diaspora in China, and “returned” to South Korea seeking job opportunities. Although they share the same ethnic background, local citizens do not perceive them that way. These Chinese Koreans are treated as passersby and offered no government aid to help them settle down. Many tend to form their own communities on the outskirts of Seoul, which look like autonomous villages, not integrated with local citizens. The researchers I met were also skeptical about the prospects of multiculturalism:

We are aware that multiculturalism in South Korea has been criticized as reverse discrimination. It is true that the government used a huge budget to support “multicultural families” and neglected impoverished Korean citizens. The “otherization” of migrants and the pity for their misery met a great reaction. Perceiving this atmosphere, children of multicultural families try to hide their heterogeneous background. In my college class I tried to ask students which they prefer, multiculturalism or assimilationism. Most students took assimilationism. In case they migrate to a different country, many want to adopt local culture, rather than maintaining their native culture. I doubt if multiculturalism is applicable to Asian context. Perhaps the mixture of multiculturalism and assimilationism is more preferable for better migration policies. [Mr. Lee, Feb 24, 2016]
Jasmine Lee is the first non-Korean lawmaker in South Korea's National Assembly. She married a Korean man and naturalized from the Philippines. She has been active both as an advocate of multiculturalism and as a TV personality. But when I met her last year, she declared the end of multiculturalism in South Korea:

I do not use such terms as multicultural or multiculturalism in the Assembly. They are too vague and their definitions vary with different sections of the government. I am doing my best to improve the situation of migrants. But the public perception should be changed that they are poor people coming from poor countries. It is time we should discuss how to let migrants contribute to the Korean economy. They are precious resources for the potential market. The Korean way of thinking has not changed as rapidly as the economic development. On the other hand, it is apparent that the economic stagnation cannot be overcome by the Korean nation alone. If we can present a future plan that combines the new economic growth with the necessity of immigration, I believe people will be persuaded to change their thinking. I have a mission to accelerate this policy change as a lawmaker, and I am certainly the only specialist of this problem in the National Assembly. [Feb 25, 2016]

The position and feasibility of multiculturalism have fluctuated widely in South Korea during the past two decades. This progressive idea has invited both more realistic and nationalistic reactions. Jasmine Lee has been a continuous target for racist attacks. In fact, her name was not listed as a proportional representative of the party for the 2016 election.

3. Movements

In the early 2000s, many migrant workers struggled to improve their working conditions and human rights situations. Many Korean activists involved in labor movements supported this struggle. Multicultural ideas appealed to many people as a progressive metaphor for a new and open society. A decade later many conservative and racist reactions began appearing. At the same time, however, NGO movements continue working, persistently seeking more change in society. I will mention the case of Migrant World Television.

Migrant World Television (MWTV) is a non-profit organization established in 2004 to disseminate and advocate multiple voices of migrants in South Korea (http://mwtv.kr). The mainstream media tends to exclude the voices of migrants or reproduce the negative image of them as strange others. MWTV has struggled against this situation, and sends the migrant voices directly to Korean society. Its four main missions are production of visual programs, broadcast of migrant radio, organization of the Migrant World Film Festival, and media education for migrants. The Migrant World Film Festival is held in each fall as its main event, and it celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2015.
This is a major annual event MWTV holds to bind the migrant community with local society. It is composed of many short movies produced by not only migrants but also Korean supporters. They describe the lives and afflictions of migrants. I think this kind of cultural activity is hard to continue in terms of time and finance for migrants in any country. Mr. T. from Myanmar, a former representative of MWTV, testified this point. He came to South Korea in 1994 based on the foreign trainee system:

Trainees were considered to be just cheap labor in this country. It is not an exaggeration to say that I was treated as a slave. I woke up at 6 am and was forced to work up to midnight in a pump factory. I could not eat Korean food then; eventually my whole body started to shiver from hunger. So I managed to learn to eat anything at hand. I did not have my private space; sometimes three men were put in a single shower-box to sleep. I tried to forget my past and changed my mind to start over; otherwise I could not stand such misery. I could not speak Korean at first. But as I started to understand the language, my colleagues would always tease me by asking me if I had ever seen rice or the ocean in my country. I was treated as a petty fellow coming from a miserable country. I just worked hard and imagined that I would not be teased like this if my country could develop like the US someday. [Aug 23, 2009]

The wages were very low at first, but as Mr. T. moved to other factories and developed his career, his wages approached average. After many years of toiling to remit money to his family in Myanmar, he realized his own dream of attending college. He enrolled in night school to learn sociology. He moved to the city of Seoul; many factories are located at the outskirts of Seoul, and it takes many hours to go to college. When I met him first in 2009, he had already changed his life style. He continued to study, and in the daytime, he worked as a staff member of MWTV. Sometimes he worked a part time job for additional money, but remained in South Korea not solely for money any longer.

Next year he became a representative of MWTV. He was eventually recognized as a Myanmar refugee by the Korean government; his position changed dramatically. He was able to enter South Korea as a trainee. After his visa expired, he stayed as an illegal worker for many years. His life focus changed from money-making to academic learning and advocacy for migrants. Although he did not learn film-making, he found this medium to be an interesting and useful means to spread migrant voices to society:

I made a short film with my friend to show at the Migrant World Film Festival. It was about the message that migrant workers and Korean workers are working together as the same family. We are denounced as illegal workers, but we are proud to say that those products “made in Korea” are actually made by “us.” Now I am preparing video materials
that would help migrant workers adapt to Korean society. [Aug 23, 2009]

His life in South Korea epitomizes that of the migrant worker. The early part can be described as miserable, but anyone including migrant workers can change and develop. Since he has been recognized as a refugee, his position has become comparatively stable. He is now free to travel to other countries. Myanmar has also dramatically changed its political situation since 2015. He can now travel to his mother country to meet his family and seek new opportunities.

I am not going to draw a rosy picture from his case. Even if one hopes to engage in cultural activities, it is extremely difficult for migrants to find the time for activities outside of work. Overworked for money, and too exhausted for other life activities — that is usually the case. After Mr. T. resigned his position at MWTV, no other migrant took over for him. Two Korean women have succeeded the representation so far. MWTV may continue to develop, but the active participation of migrants is hard to realize.

4. Happiness and nationalism

The concept of happiness is extremely difficult to use in the anthropological analysis. On one hand, there is a relativist view of happiness. Johann Gottfried von Herder presents such a view as a father of cultural relativism or pluralism. In *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man*, he stated as follows:

Happiness is an internal state, and therefore its standard is not seated without us, but in the breast of every individual where alone it can be determined; another has as little right to constrain me to adopt his feelings as he has power to impart to me his mode of perception and convert his identity into mine. Let us not place, therefore, from indolent pride or too common presumption, the form and standard of human happiness higher or lower than it has been fixed by the creator, for he alone knows what a mortal can attain upon Earth (Herder 2016:185).

This kind of view has been most persuasive for ethnographers who try to describe the unique nature of each culture. But on the other hand, even ethnographers cannot ignore the significance of standardized happiness indexes. As globalization develops and a common life-style prevails in many parts of the world, measurements of happiness, well-being, life satisfaction, and so forth are becoming more and more significant. This is particularly true for those developed countries in East Asia, because they are notorious for high GDP and low Gross National Happiness (GNH). South Korea is a front-runner of this paradox.

For example, according to the World Happiness Report published by the United Nations in 2016, South Korea is ranked 58th (Japan 53rd, Hong Kong 75th). The suicide rate has
risen dramatically since the late 1990s along with the heightened competition to survive globalization. It has ranked top among OECD member countries since 2004. There are many indexes that suggest prevailing mental problems including high addiction rates to alcohol (13.4%) and gambling (5.4%). I could continue this unhappy listing more specifically (Tosa 2018). But the point is already clear that South Korea is characterized by low happiness indexes contrasted with its higher rank of GDP (11th.) This paradox is shared with neighboring countries like Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. In this phenomenon there is a universal problem to be sought transnationally. We need to adjust the limit of ethnographic study to tackle this problem.

I think Liah Greenfeld’s ‘nationalism trilogy’ presents a good theoretical clue regarding this problem (Greenfeld 1992, 2001, 2013). It is not an easy task to summarize her voluminous work, so here I will confine myself to presenting a basic framework of her thesis. According to Greenfeld, the meaning of “nation” changed drastically in England in the early 16th century from a designation including only the elite class to a comprehensive category equated with “people.” This semantic change was a reflection of social mobility and social imagination, and, more importantly, predated modernization represented by capitalism and media development.

Nationalism, in Greenfeld’s framework, is mainly based on three principles: equality (and liberty), self-definition (identity), and secularism. Nationalism is a response to the contradictions of traditional class society that was declining. Once adopted, nationalism became the major source of radical transformation in human history, as illustrated by the obsession with economic development, or capitalism, for example. The secular concept of equality, unlike religious ideals, drives man to endless competition, and promotes the prevalence of madness, or social anomic.

This is a simplified epitome of her argument. I believe this framework is quite suggestive to the understanding of the modern history of East Asia. The concept of “nation” arrived at this region in the 19th century before the birth of modernity, not the other way around.

The Greenfeld’s view of happiness is equally suggestive in this context. According to her, “happiness” is also a new concept, invented in England in the second half of the sixteenth century. Happiness does not simply mean positive emotions, but a complex reaction to the new environment created by nationalism.

It should no longer come as a surprise that happiness became possible only in the sixteenth century and that the only place in which, for some time, it was possible was England. Neither the concept nor, therefore, the experience existed before. It was, like love, ambition, and success, a product of the national—fundamentally secular and humanistic—image of reality. Students of happiness, which is gaining popularity as an academic subject, always forget that one cannot access any cultural phenomenon by translation.
backwards. Guided by the worthy sentiment, ingrained in every society considering itself Western since World War II, that all men are created equal, they assume the uniformity of human experience and aspiration (which, the readers of this chapter know, could not be experienced before the sixteenth century) throughout the ages, and, sure enough, find happiness or at least desire for happiness everywhere. But the fact is that no language before modern English had a word for it—therefore it could not be even desired—and there was no word for it, because happiness in a world ruled by transcendental forces of whatever variety was inconceivable (Greenfeld 2013: 338-339).

Nationalism gave us happiness: more exactly, it gave us aspiration for happiness, which is usually destined to fail. Happiness is the ultimate purpose of human existence, but since it is always connected with fierce competition based on equal status, most people are destined to be unhappy. Unhappiness is a synonym of madness created by nationalism. I think this theoretical perspective is right, as far as today’s East Asia is concerned.

South Korea, through the painful process of decolonization and developmental dictatorship, showed the great power of nationalism. Its collective cohesion based on monoculturalism was the great source of mass mobilization for rapid economic development. But this process seems to lead to a dead end along with globalization and demographic transformation. If the argument of Greenfeld is right, the prevalence of madness, or social anomie, is a last symptom of the process of nationalism. Multiculturalism may be one of the solutions to prevent this catastrophe. However, what about the prospect from the migrants’ viewpoint?

5. Happiness and migrants

The migrants’ viewpoint is not a static element. Migrants’ happiness indexes are said to be lower than the majority of the host society (Simpson 2011). However, as we saw in the case of Mr. T., we need to think in terms of process, not from the static structural position. The early part of his migrant life was definitely miserable and unhappy, both objectively and subjectively. As he struggled to attain more meaningful goals for his life, it became more and more difficult to assess his happiness. When I first met him for an interview, he released his grief and anger about his experience. But as we continued our intimate relationship for several years, he gradually came to avoid his unhappy memories. Once I asked him if he was happy. He promptly answered: “Yes, I am very happy.” That was after he had been recognized as a refugee, and his life became relatively stable. Maybe this is another anecdote testifying as to the resilience of the human mind. He seemed to recover his Buddhist faith in the axis of his life. Moreover, it seems to me that there is a strange exchange of happiness between migrants and the host society.

Broadly speaking, the advanced countries in East Asia boast high GDP but low GNH. On
the contrary, the developing countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia usually boast high
GNH with low GDP. Migration takes place based on this strange contrast. They exchange
money with labor, but that is not all. They also exchange some intangible values through
migration. Those values can be summarized by the concept of happiness. Family values are a
typical example.

Migrants are not passive beings simply being teased and discriminated against by local
people. What is characteristic of today’s landscape is that minorities can fight back. They will
seek various forms of practice and resistance by re-inspiring their family values. I will cite the
words of Mr. T. again:

I think we should learn from the fact that Korean people work very hard and contribute
much to their company. But I sometimes wonder for what they are working, working
twelve hours a day. In Myanmar, even oxen work only in the cool morning and rest in
the daytime. Even if my country is poor, there are many types of poverty. We do not have
to work very hard for a living, that is one type. We believe oxen are also members of the
family in Myanmar. But in South Korea, migrants are not considered to be equal. I wish
they would understand that living a slow life is sometimes more valuable than efficiency.
[Aug 23, 2009]

I have heard many similar critical voices from migrants, not only in South Korea, but also
in Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Those voices are resistance against exploitation. And they
are re-inspirations of the family values that were conventionally natural in the migrants’ home
countries. It is very difficult to assess the general significance of such exchanges of happiness,
because it is not an automatic process; rather it is a precarious one based on the imaginations
of both migrants and the people of the host society. Anthropologists also must use creative
imaginings to understand how such faint dialogue can affect the future of happiness in the
whole society. Here I will content myself with presenting some general formulas for a future
comparative study.

A nation consists of members of equal citizenship. Since the membership is not static,
neither is the nation. A member is recruited from birth or migration, and obliterated with
return or death. The growth from a baby to an adult through education is a most natural
process to sustain a nation. Here, we find no discrepancy between cultural identity and
citizenship. However, we should bear in mind that this kind of stable continuity is exceptional
in human history. Almost all the modern states need new members through migration due
to the existence of so many kinds of structural contradictions, such as demographic change,
transformation of industrial structure, and deficiencies of social welfare. We need migrants to
sustain “us,” but this special recruitment threatens us somehow. If we argue as to whether or
not they belong to us, the natural process of a nation is also thrown into question. If they are
granted citizenship and remain to be different, we do not feel at home in our own society. If
their citizenship is denied because they are different, the principle of equality is denied, so the
nation is threatened, too. Either way, we confront a contradictory situation.

Minorities present such an ontological contradiction to the nation, but many countries
try to do with stopgap measures, sometimes referred to as multicultural policies. However,
they never solve real contradictions that necessarily come from the nature of the nation. If
the nation, according to the very strong secular concept, continues to be applied to extended
populations, this expansion will accompany a grey zone category of people, such as migrants,
second-class citizens, slaves, and the like. Many nation-states have shown this pattern even up
to today, even if they are not labeled as colonialism. In conclusion I would like to stress three
points in particular.

1) According to an important precedent work by Kymlicka and He (2005), it is a global
trend to transform from the old model based on assimilationist nationalism to multiculturalism
in Asia as well. Politicians no longer endeavor to exclude or assimilate minorities to protect
their old ideology of “one state, one nation, one language.” Though a similar process is
observed, many Asian countries are still sticking to the old model to assimilate minorities into
the mainstream.

I propose that such a liberal perspective is not sufficient to grasp the reality and future
of Asian countries. Nationalism is not an old model for developed countries in East Asia: it
has been a dominant model for modernity, economic development, and equal citizenship.
Greenfeld’s “nationalism trilogy” clarifies this relationship. Even multiculturalism remains
to be part of nationalism or its extension rather than operating as a new model. On the other
hand, for many countries in Southeast and South Asia, nationalism has not been an attainable
model in reality: these societies have essentially proven to be much more multiethnic and
multicultural compared to the West, and it is doubtful that they need to inject nationalism at
all for more economic development but for less happiness.

2) Multiculturalism can be better described as an extension of nationalism in East Asia.
However, we cannot ignore the strong tension between the two. The relationship between
the two can be characterized as complementary as far as multicultural policies ameliorate
the contradictions of the nation-states. In other words, multiculturalism remains to be a
kind of exceptionalism, such as the Concessions, the Special Economic Zones, and the Special
Administrative Regions of China (Ong 2006).

In actuality, however, they present new problems and threaten the basic premises of the
nation. As we have seen, the nation is not a static category, but a secular ideal to approach with
consistent endeavor. Nationalism has been and will ever be an “unfinished project.” Minorities
inside the state, in particular new migrants, widen the gap between the ideal and reality because the policies mobilized are not consistent. The governments sometimes try to assimilate minorities into the mainstream to maintain the consistency of the nation, but at times simply exclude them as second-class citizens. The oscillation between inclusion and exclusion is not consistent, and will invite more unpredictable trajectories.

3) Lastly, we should consider the meanings of the asymmetrical relationship between the host societies of East Asia and those developing countries as providers of migrants. Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia, and other developing countries send many migrants overseas and are still in the process of nation-building. Serious class divisions, corrupt governments, and the great ethnic diversity of the populations—these are some of the important factors hindering those countries from nation-building. Thus, the security of people’s lives resides not with the government or in the public sphere, but in the intimate community represented by family and kinship. Ironically, therefore, even if these groups’ lives appear to be poor from the perspective of the outside world, they subjectively feel more secure than that of those in competitive capitalist societies. This is a sociological background that has preserved the significance of family values. Here is a clue to consider the problem of happiness from migrants’ viewpoints: if the host society becomes tolerant enough to listen to migrant voices, the dialogue between different values can mitigate the nationalistic symptoms of the host society and make people happier.

It is evident that there is still a hierarchical structure between the host society and minorities who are exploited, discriminated, and excluded as inferior beings. One may call this situation a new version of colonialism. However, what is characteristic of today’s landscape is that minorities can fight back: they can unite, organize activities, occupy the public space, take legal actions, seek higher education to climb the social ladder, and represent their criticism in various art forms. The strategies and measures they employ vary from one group to another, from one individual to another. Yet the common feature is that the power structure, if any, is not a frozen eternal entity.

Maybe one has heard of a similar account by a Filipino domestic helper in Hong Kong who stated, “I came here from a poor country. But my employers live in a much smaller apartment than my house in my home country, and they speak worse English than us.” I know of many similar anecdotes in other cities. Migrants or minorities never believe that they are totally inferior to the majority of the host society: on the contrary, they themselves are aware that their economically poor situation is better and happier than employers’ lives, which are often shattered by the busy capitalist system. Therefore, even if the colonial hierarchy exists in Asia, it is different from Western colonialism. This has already been proven by the colonial history of Japan, whose supremacy has been surpassed by neighboring countries in many respects. We should continue to observe whether a similar cycle will take place in the near future. I believe
the perspective to link multiculturalism with nationalism will provide a vital clue to attempt to answer this problem. Happiness is one of the key issues that symbolically represent this link.

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* Part of this manuscript was presented at the EAAA Hong Kong Conference 2017, 14-15 October.
† World Happiness Report 2018 focused on the relationship between happiness and migrants (Helliwell 2018). Four points can be derived from this report for future research. 1) Migrants generally move to happier countries than their home countries. 2) Since their happiness is greatly influenced by that of host countries, it is elevated along with migration. 3) People in more tolerant countries that welcome migrants are happier. 4) Average life evaluations are higher than theoretically predicted values in Latin American, and lower in East Asia. Although these findings are all enlightening, their conclusions drawn from quantitative method need to be reconsidered from more pluralistic perspectives.